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THE LEGAL CONCEPr OF THE TEACHER'S CONTRACT 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
statement of the problem: The major purpose of this 
study is to determine the nature and characteristics of the 
oontractual relationships between sohool boards of education 
and publio sohool teachers. Controversies between the board 
and the teacher have frequently arisen and have often been 
oarried to the courts. Courts have been called upon to set­
tle issues which deal with the status eXisting between the 
board and the teaoher, and thereby do exert an influence up­
on the privileges or denials, allowed or disallowed when 
oontraoting parties make suoh agreements. This study deals 
with the action of the courts, and the deoisions of the judges 
as based upon and governed by the facts of the case. 
There are some points which are assumed but until test­
ed may prove fallacies. Is a teacher who holds a oertifi­
oate really a teacher? From what do the rights, duties and 
liabilities of a teacher arise? When is a contract legal? 
2 
How	 long is the teacher employed under it? Can the teach­
er	 reoover his salary under it? May he be dismissed, and 
if so, on what grounds? What are the statutory and common 
law requisites of the teacher's oontract ot employment? 
When, and by whom may public school teachers be dismissed? 
When may a teacher recover compensation? What discrepancy 
eXists, between educational practices and the legal rules and 
procedures in references to dismissal of teachers? 
It is important that all persons in the teaching profes­
sion who are anxious to perform their function in education 
and wish to avoid inharmonious contacts should have an in­
terest concerning these issues. 
Perhaps the results ot such a study would tend to reduce 
the number of controversies arising and would provide tor a 
more harmonious attitude between teacher and the party or 
parties to whom he is responsible. 
Purpose ot the study 
This study has been made for the purpose ot: 
(1)	 Discovering these issues pertinent to teacher 
contracts, which have been adjUdicated by the 
judioial tribunals of the various states. 
(2)	 Correlating and revealing some legal prinoiples 
which have been decisive of cases in whi'ch the 
issues involved were related to teacher con­
tracts, and which might serve as praotioal aids 
to those who may be confronted by legal questions 
:3 
pertaining to teacher contracts. 
(3)	 Attempting to discover trends in the attitude 
of the judiciary towards issues pertinent to 
teacher contraots. 
Souroes of Data. 
The repQrts of oases deoided by the Supreme Courts of 
the various states and the United States, the National Re­
porter Systems of the various states, and the United States 
reports, were the ohief' souroes of the study. A handbook of 
oases l dealing with ruling case law was also used. Several 
textbooks 2 and some research 1nvestigations3 along legal 
oases 1n education were also examined for for.m, and organi­
zation of the legal data. 
Final efforts at classifioation resulted in the follow­
ing general headings, whioh have been used as chapter head­
iuga: 
iRuling Case Law, Vol. XXIV. 
2Trusler, Harry Raymond. Essential_s of Sohool Law, 
Pp. vi & 175.­
Morehart, Grover C., The Legal Status of City Sohool 
Boards, Pp. vii & 96. 
Maian, Clement T., Indiana Sohool Law and Supreme
Court Deo i sions ,. pp. x & 472. ­
3Edwards, I. N., "Legal Authority of Boards of Eduoa­
tion", Elementary School Journal, XXX (February, 1930), 
431-439. 
Edwards, I. N., "Marriage as the Legal Cause for Dis­
missal of Women Teaohers," Elementary school Journal,
XXV (May, 1925), 692-695. 
Anderson, Earl William, The Teacher's Contraot and 
Other Legal Phases of Teacher status, Pp. 1 & 8. 
4 
(1) Introduction 
(2) The Teacher's Contract 
(3) Contractual Powers of the School Board 
(4) Removal and Dismissal of Teachers 
(5) Contractual Powers of tbe Teacher 
The chapter headings are not mutually inclusive in all in­
stances but seem to be logical divisions to the author. 
Limitations or study 
This is not an attempt toclassi fy legislative acts of 
the various states with regard to Contractual Powers, Cer­
tificate Requirements, Tenure Codes, or Formal ReqUisites of 
Teachers' Contracts. Cubberly and others have written ex­
oellent treatises on Certification of Teachers. 4 This study 
deals only with those powers of school boards and teachers 
as revealed in common law deoisions relative to the teacher's 
contract. The contractual status is a single phase of the 
legal status. The title represents an attempt to delimit 
olearly the scope of this investigation. The term ~teacher" 
used in this study refers to the "public school teacher", al­
though the legal import of the term, however, is wide enough 
to include superintendent, supervisors, principals, and oth­
er supervisory officers. 
4Cubberly, Ellwood P., "Certification of Teachers~, 
N.S.P.E. Fifth Year Book, Pt. II, Pp. 1-88. 
CHAPTER II
 
~HE TEACHER'S CONTRACT
 
Introduetion: It is the contract of employment, strict­
ly speaking, which changes the mere holder of a teaoher's cer­
-
titicate into a teacher. It is also the contract which in­
vests the teacher with his publio charaeter and establishes a 
legal re~ationship between the board of education and the 
teacher. It 1s the purpose of the contract to secure a def­
inite written statement of an agreement. This may include 
that the teacher will teach in a system for the sucoeeding 
year. It may also be an agreement of certain duties and reg­
ulations as to payme,nts for absence, and salary schedule. The 
oontraot may inform the teacher of certain legal rights which 
usually oan be gained only, by the board contractua~ly, such 
as the right to terminate upon definite notice, or to termi­
nate for marriage of the teacher. The contract usually gives 
the time and length of serVice and salary. 
The variety of stipulations found in oontraot forms in­
dioates that many oontraotual reservations grow out of diffi­
oulties that have arisen between teaohers and sohool boards. 
A sruvey of a variety of possible diffioulties shows the fu­
tility of attempting to provide for them in the contraot form 
itself. 
In twenty-three states; Arkansas, Indiana, Idaho, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massaohusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississip­
pi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota t Vermont, Virginia, 
West Virginia, and Wisoonsin, there are statutes whioh designate 
speoifio items that must appear in the oontraot forms. The In­
diana state form has the largest number of items - forty in num­
ber. Twenty states have no laws stipulating What must be in 
the oontraot. 
In a study of oontraot f'orms made by E. W. AnderSon,l whioh 
study oonsisted of colleoting forms in cities f'rom 10,000 and up 
to 100,000 f'rom 50 per oent of his forms f'rom oities of 100,000 
or over, he has tabulated fifty-eight speoific duties of' the 
teacher. He comments thus: 
In the main these reter to duties usually expected of the 
teaoher. Duties outside of school, including restrictions, 
refer to outside of sohool work at other oallings, residence 
in the district, visitation of homes, attendanoe at summer 
sohools, enrollment in extension classes, abstinence from danc­
ing and from social activities on school nights, and from tu­
toring pupils. Only one case of each of the three last re­
striotions oocurred in the contracts studied. 'I 
lAnderson, Earl W1lligm, The Teacher's Contract and other 
Legal Phases of Teacher status, pp. 1 & 8. 
6 
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In the same study the author points out that between 1907 
and 1916 a study of the cases of teacher-board litigation shows 
that 22 per oent or the cases might have been avoided by the 
wording or the contract. 
Since the contract is an agreement that the teacher is 
to 1~truct under the supervision of the board of education, 
the teacher holds his position by virtue or suoh an agreement. 
The teacher contrao~ does not d1~fer from any other oontract­
ual relationship. It may, therefore, be judged by the same 
oriteria as any other oontraot. 
The common law has established a series of requisites 
oommon to all simple contracts and, except when controlled by 
statute the making and execution of contracts with teachers 
in the public sohools are governed by the rules and principles 
relating to simple contraots in general. 2 The "common law" 
requisites make up one division of essentials and the "statu­
tory requisites", giving those prescribed by statute, such as 
requiring contract to be 1n writing, to be filed with the clerk, 
and other requisites, make up the second division of essential 
requisites of teacher oontracts. 
Williston3 in his treatise on Contracts, states that the 
requirements for the formation of a simple contract are: 
(1) Parties of legal capacity; (2) An expression of 
mutual assent of the parties to a promise or set of promises; 
(3) An agreed valid consideration. The agreement must also not 
2cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 1081. 
3Williston, E. W., Contracts, Vol. I, pp. 17-18. 
be declared void by statute or oammon law. 
As these requisites are common to all simple oontracts 
it will suffice our purpose to illustrate the applioation of 
them in a few typioal teaoher oontraots. Thus, a vote of the 
board of eduoation of a oity in favor of employing a oertain 
person as teaoher does not oonstitute a oontraot with suoh a 
person, where the board immediately after the balloting rtthen 
and there" refuses to deolare said person eleoted. The oourt 
sa1d: 
Employment implies a oontraot on the part of the employ­
er to hire and on the part of the employee to perform serv­
ioes; and until suoh oontraot is mutually entered into it oan 
have no binding obligation on either party.4 
Again, a oontraot between sohool direotors and a teaoher 
to pay good wages laoks definiteness as to oonsiderationand 
would, therefore, be too indefinite to found aotion upon. In 
an early Indiana oase, where it was assumed that no statute 
required the oontraot of the teaoher to be in writing, a teaoh­
er entered into a verbal agreement with a trustee, who agreed 
to pay her rtgood wages" to teaoh the ensuing term of sohool. 
In a suit for damages brought by the teaoher against the dis­
trioton aooount of its refusal to allow her to teaoh, it was 
held that beoause of indefiniteness no oontraot had been 
formed. "It is neoessary -for the information of the oitizens," 
said the oourt, "that oontraots made with teaohers should be 
oertain and definite in their terms; otherwise the oitizens 
oannot guard their interests, nor observe the oonduot of their 
4Mallol v. Board of Eduoation, 102 Cal. 642. 
8 
ottioers. n5 
Fraudulent representation that a teacher was not mar­
ried and would remain unmarried, made in order to seoure a 
oontraot to teaoh, would be an illustration of an agreement 
to be deolared void by the oammon law. 6 
It is essential to the validity of a teaoher contraot 
that it oomply with all the for.mal requisites prescribed by 
the statutes controlling i~. Suoh requisites will vary with­
in different jurisdiotions and no general rule oan be laid 
down. The following statutory requisites, however, are among 
the most· important ones noted, viz: oontraot to be in writ­
ten form; to be signed by proper board offioers; to be signed 
by the parties to the oontraot; time and plaoe of teaohing to 
be speoified; mnount ot wages to be paid, and other agree­
ments. 
Teaohers enter into contraots with boards ot sohool oon­
trol in wh1~1s vested the authority to oontraot for teaohing 
servioes within a publio sohool distriot. The outstanding 
essential of a board's authority to oontraot With a teaoher 
11es in unitary or oorporate aotion. Individual members of 
a board of sohool control have no authority as indiVidual mem­
bers to oontraot with teaohers. Their authority as members 
lies in their aotivity as a board and not as individual mem­
bers of a board. For this reason boards may repudiate what 
OFairplay Sohool Township v. O'Neal, 127 Ind. 95; 27 Ind. 
App. 65. 
6Guilford Sohool Townshi~ v. Roberts, 62 N.E. 711. 
9 
individual members do. 
Thus, where board members agree in their individual 
oapacity to employ a certain teacher and, sUbsequently, in 
a board meeting repudiate their individual agreements, the 
teacher has no redress as the agreement is held to be void 
on the ground of pUblic policy.? The teacher's contraot of 
employment is a corporate contract and the statutes usually 
stipulate the manner of its authorization. 8 Thus it was held 
that in the selection or a teaoher the statutes required the 
teaoher to be selected by the school board, and that a con­
tract between the president and secretary of the board with­
out the ooncurrence of the board was invalid, and could not 
be enforced. In such instance the court said: 
This statute is a valuable one, intended to compel the 
expression of each individual member or the school board on 
the subject all important in public education, and this for 
the very purpose or preventing jobbery, and the exercise of 
one-man power in the conduct or our oommon schools.9 
By virtue of tbe corporate oharacter of the board's 
authority, it follows that a board of sohool control must 
convene as a board in order to enter into a valid contract 
of employment wi th a te,aoher. Regarding the employment of 
teaohers, the rule is generally stated that a oontract With 
a teacher must be agreed upon at a convened meeting of the 
?McCortle v. Bates, 29 Ohio st. 419; McGinn v. Willer, 
t) Cal. App. 111. 
8nennison Township v. Padden, 89 Fa. st. 395; Graham 
v. school District, 33 Ore. 263; McNolty v. Board or Educa­
tion, 102 wis. 261; Malloy v. Boara of Education, 102 Cal. 
'642:" 
9nennison TOwnship v. padden, 89 Pa. st. 395. 
=== 
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board of school control of whioh all members had due notice 
and an opportunity to be present. 10 This rule is supported 
by the overwhelming weight 01' author1 ty J and the oases nega­
tiving the necessity of a formal meeting of the board for the 
valid employment of a teacher are limited. ll 
Short excerpts from leading decisions here follow to in­
dicate the principle upon which necessity, notice, and oppor­
tunity of meeting are predicated. 
It is an elementary principle of law that when several 
persons are authorized to do an act 01' a public nature, which 
requires deliberation, they all should be conven~d because 
the advice and opinion 01' all may be usetul, though all do 
not unite in the opinion. (Alman v. School Distri,ct. )10
The determination of the members individually 1s not the 
determination of the board. A board must act as a unit and 
in the manner prescribed•••• The statute does not vest the 
powers of the district in three persons .but in a single board 
called the district board. (Harrington v. District Township 
ot Liston.)lO 
The public selects each member of the board of direct­
ors and is entitled to his service. This it can not enjoy, 
i~ two members can bind it without receiving or even sutter­
ing the counsel 01' the other. Two could, if they differed 
with the third, overrule his jUdgment and aot without regard­
ing it, but he might by his knowledge and reason change the 
bent of their minds, and the opportunity must be given him• 
••• No contract oan be made except at a meeting, and no meet­
ing oan be held unless all are present or unless the absent 
member had notice. (School District v. Bennett.)lO 
lOA1kman v. sohool District, 27 Kan. 129; Armstrong v. 
School Distriot, reO Ill. App. 430; Barton v. School District, 
77 Ore. 50, Ann. Cas. 19l7A 252; Ballard v. Davis, 31 MIss. 
533; Casto v. Board 01' Education, 38 W. va. 707; Harrington 
'"I. Liston, 47 Iowa 11; ~yan v. Humt~ri;2' 50 Okla. 343, L.R.A. 
1915 F 1047; School Dis. v. Benne, Ark. 511; Wintz v. 
Board of Education, 28 W. Va. 227. ­
I1Hermance v. Publio School Distriot, 20 Ariz. 314; 
MontsQmer! v. state, 35 Neb. 655; Russell v. state, 13 Neb. 
68; Schoo District v. stone, 14 Colo. App. 211; state 01' 
Indiana v. Vanosdol, 15 L. R. A. 832 (Ind.); Weatnerby v. 
city of Chattanooga, Tennessee Ct. App. 1898. 
12 
An interesting question is raised as to whether boards 
of school control, exercising the wide discretion of appoint­
ive power. may delegate their authority to enter into con­
tract with teachers, to individual board members, or board 
o~ficers such as secretary, clerk, and superintendent of 
schools. Obviously, an agreement among school directors to 
parcel out among themselves the control of the district 
sohools. delegating to each authority to engage a teacher 
for a particular sohool. is void. 12 Moreover, the law un­
doubtedly holds that while boards may delegate to the super­
intendent of schools the power of seleoting teachers, the 
power to authorize the appointment of teaohers cannot be del­
egated, suoh power having been specifioally oonferred upon 
boards by statutes. The maxtm delegata potestas non £?test 
d~legari applies. The power to appoint is vested solely in 
the board of school control. Such power requires judgment 
on the part of school direotors and therefore cannot be del­
egated. Excerpts from leading deoisions establish this prin­
ciple of law. 
This power of appointment requi~es an exercise of jUdg­
ment and oould not be delegated to the secretary or anybody 
else•••• Parties dealing with a municipal corporation are bound 
to know the extent of the power lawfully confided to the of­
ficers with whom they are dealing in behalf of such corpora­
tion and they must guide their conduct accordingly.13
The plaintiff had no right to rely upon the action of 
the superintendent as a basis of service in the oapacity of 
teacher so as to become ultimately one of the permanently em­
ployed teachers. A knowledge of the law is imputed to her. 
l~tchell v. Williams, 46 S. W. 325.
 
l3Coleman v. Distriot of Columbia, 279 Fed. 990.
 
13 
There is no suoh th1ng as apparent soope of authority in one 
professing to aot as an agent for a public munioipality of 
which the power and manner of exercise are so strictly and 
minutely defined by statute•••• If one oontracts with another 
professing to aot as agent of the distriot it is at the peril
of the oontraoting party. 14 
It does not follow, however, from the above-quoted auth­
ority, that a superintendent of sohools may not be delegated 
the authority to oontraot with a partioular teaoher. That 
would not be the delegation of the speoifio authority to oon­
traot with teachers but rather an authorization to oontraot in 
a particular instanoe. Thus in Denison v. Inhabitants of Vinal 
Haven the court says: 
It appears by the evidenoe that it was customary in that 
town for the superintendent to hire the teaohers. The school 
oommdttee could not delegate this authority to any other per­
son or persons in the sense of relieving the~elves from re­
sponsibility, but there oan be no question that the superin­
tendent of sohools could employ teaohers at their request. 15 
In oase the superintendent of s'ohools employs teaohers with­
out any authorization of the board, as is often done in prao­
tice, then the validity of the contraot made with the teaoh­
er depends upon sUbsequent rat'ification by the board in whom 
the appointive power rests. 
Statutes qUite generally make invalid a teacher contraot 
in which a board member holds or may hold a pecuniary inter­
est. Thus a oontract with a near relative of a board member 
is held invalid. 16 The provisions of suoh statutes, however, 
14Tagsart v. School District, 96 Oregon, 422, 188 Pac. 
908. 
15Denison v. Inhabitants of Vinal Haven, 100 Me. 136. 
16Nuokols v. Lyle, 8 Ida. 589, 70 Pao. 401. 
do not apply to relatives not speoified within the statutes. 17 
The authority to oontract with teachers imp~ies the power 
to agree upon compensation,18 and it is immaterial that the 
oompensation fixed for the teacher exoeeds the estimate or 
needs previously deter.mined for the separate sohools.19 The 
authority to oontraot with teaohers oarries with 1t the ab­
solute r1ght to decline to employ or reemploy an applicant 
for the position or teaoher for any or no reason,20 nor will 
mandamus lie to oompel such employment by the board. 21 
In the absenoe of statutory provisions to the oontrary, 
oral oontracts with teachers are valid. 22 There is no law of 
oontracts making it inherently necessary to place a teacher's 
oontraot in writing. It is true, that most jurisdictions pro­
vide by statutes, that boards of school control are empower­
ed to contract w1th teachers, to enter into written oontracts, 
and to file the same with the clerk. A good statement as to 
the doctr1ile of validity of oral oontraots e'ntered into with 
te·aohers is found in Pearson v. School Dis.trj,ct. 23 It sh.ould 
be observed in this case that the two jUdges Who dissented 
trom the majori ty opinion d1d so on the ground t hat the par... 
tictilar statute did require contracts with teachers to be 
17Board 01' Education v. Beal, 135 N.E. 540. 
18Deoatur v.- Auditor of CIti" of Peabody, 146 N. E. 360. 
l~sams v. Board Of Commissioners, 72 Okla. 84. 
20FeO;ple v. City 01' Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, L.R.A. 1917. 
21Malloy v. Board of Education, 102 Cal. 642. 
22Griggs v. School District, 87 Ark. 93; Jameson v. Board 
or Education; 74 W. Va. 389; Jaokson school Township v. Shere, 
e Ind. App. 330; Roberts v. Clay City, 102 Ky. 68. ~ 
23Pearson v. School Distriot, 144 Wis. 620. 
14 
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reduoed to writing. They disagreed with the majority of the 
court in regard to the interpretation of the statute. They 
did not, however, dissent from the dootrine of the validity 
of oral oontracts in absenoe of statutory requirements. The 
gist of the majority opinion in this oase follows: 
•••• But the statute does not say that the contraot must 
be in writing, and the oourt oannot read into the statute pro­
visions not found here for the purpose of rendering an oral 
oontraot, otherwise unobjeotionable, void beoause not in writ­
ing, in the absenoe of express statutory requirement. An 
oral oontraot by a school teaoher with a munioipality or sohool 
distriot is valid, in the absenoe of requirement that it be in 
writing••.• The provision relied upon by applioant is, at best, 
only direotory•••• It is a detail respeoting the keeping of a 
reoord, and not a limitation upon the power to make an oral 
oontraot. If the Legislature intended that suoh a oontraot 
should be void if not in writing, it would have so deolared • 
•••• Here the board did meet and vote to hire the plaintiff,
who was a qualified teacher, holding a diploma or oertifioate, 
and speoified the wages to be paid and the term of servioe. 
The plaintiff aooepted the terms, and assented to the propo­
sition of the defendant. This oonstituted a good oontraot at 
oowaon law. It needs no oitation of authority to the point
that statutes in derogation of the oo~on law must be striot­
ly oonstrued. 
It is generally held that a parol oontraot, to avoid the 
defeot of indefiniteness, must be reoorded in the minutes of 
the sohool board and the minutes duly aoo~pted. Suoh aocept­
ance of the minutes indioates the aooeptanoe of the parol oon­
traot. 24 The oase of Pollard v. Sohool Distriot,25 however, 
is authority to the oontrary on this partioular point. 
Where the statutes require that the teaoher's oontraot 
be reduoed to wr1tten form, and that no aotion shall be brought 
upon any oontraot not made in oonformity with suoh provision, 
24Costello v. sohool Distriot, 241 Pa. st. 179.
 
25Pollard v. Sohool District, 65 Ill. App. 104.
 
there can be no reoovery by the teacher either upon the oral 
agreement or upon a quantum meruit. In many jurisdictions, 
it is expressly required that a contraot with a teaoher shall 
be in WTiting,26 and failure so to conform makes the oral 
oontract with the teaoher unenforoeable at law. 27 Nor oould 
a teacher reoover on suoh an oral contraot under a quantum 
meruit, notwithstanding the services were neoessary. acoept­
able, and beneficial to the school oorporation. 28 Moreover, 
a teaoher oannot rely on a superintendent's authority to hire 
orally as the teaoher is presumed to know the law. 29 
Where a teacher has been regularly elected by a board 
of school control, it is the duty of the chairman and secre­
.tary of the board subsequently to enter into the written con­
traot with the teacher. 30 It has been observed that it is 
not neoessary that the written contraot be executed at the 
same	 time and place~by the members of the board ot school 
oontrol. Although filing and attestation of the oontraot by 
the clerk may be speoified as a statutory requirement, it 
has been held that the failure so to do oannot prejudioe the 
26Faulk v~ Mccourtnet, 42 Kan. 69,5; Gr;i.sss v. School Distriot, 87 Ark. 93; Gra am v. SohoQl Distriot, 33 Ore. 263; 
Hutchins v. Colfax TownshIp, 128 Mich. 177; Lewis v. Hayden,
18 Ky. L.R. 980; Leland v. St. Louis Co., 77 Minn. 469; Lee 
v. York School TownshiP. 163 Ind. 339; Wetmore v. st. loUIS 
Board of Education, 86 Mo. App. 362. 
27City School Co~oratlon v. Hiokman, 47 Ind. App. 500; 
Hutchins	 v. Colfax Township, 128 MIch. 177.
 
28Lee v. York School Township, 163 Ind. 339.
 
29Taggart v. Soh. Dist., 96" Or. 422,188 Pac. 908.
 
30Davison v. Harrison, 140 Ky. 520.
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teaoher, ~or suoh aots are not within oontrol o~ the teaoh­
er. 31 Suoh aots are held to be direotory rather than manda­
tory. 
Notwithstanding the rigid requirements of statutes 1n 
re~erenoe to contractual requisites already oonsidered, the 
oourts will o~ten ~ind a substantial oomplianoe with the 
statutory formalities and thus maintain the validity of the 
teaoher's oontraot. 
Thus, where a contraot was signed by a teaoher and trus­
tee with the time for length of servioe left blank until it 
oould be asoertained, the validity of the oontraot was not 
tmpaired. 32 Again, a teaoher's contraot was not held void 
where the teaoher's oertifioate did not aooompany it. 33 Fail­
ure of direotors to sign full name,34 or to sign the oon­
traot,35 was held not to invalidate the oontraot where other 
requisites were sUbstantially complied with. Again, it has 
been held that lack of formality in reoording board minutes 
would not invalidate a teacher's contraot. 36 Failure to ex­
eoute duplicate oontraots has been held not to impair the 
validity,37 and where a teacher made a oontraot signed by a 
. 31McShone v. Sohool_District, 70 Mo. App. 124. 
32Atkins v. Van Buren School Township, 77 Ind. 447. 
33State v. Board of Eduoation, 95 W. Va. 57. 
34RY~ v. Sohool Distriot, 27 Minn~ 433; Langston v. 
Sohool Dis riot. 
35Farrell v. Sohool Distriot, 98.Mioh. 43. 
36Cluene v. Sohool District, 166 Wis. 452. 
( 37~ v. School District, 107 Ark. 305. 
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director who was at the same time president of the board it 
was not invalidated by reason of failure of the president to 
approve and file with the board. Here, as in previous oases 
cited, there was substantial oompliance with the statutory 
requirements. 58 
If, through a mutual mistake, the writing fails to ex~ 
press the oontraot in anr material partioular, it may be re­
formed by a oourt of equity; for example, the signature of 
a oontraot by "0. M. Lloyd, township trustee", may be oharged 
in eqUity to "0. M. Lloyd, sohool trustee" where under a state 
law a township trustee has no authority to employ a teacher. 39 
It appears in an Indiana ease that a certain Miss Taylor 
applied to a school board for a position. The reoord of the 
board contained the following: W;Moved and seconded that the 
following teaoher,s be employed for the ensuing year: Misses 
Dean, Coats, Riggins, and Taylor - carried." Later, however, 
the trustees repudiated this alleged oontract with Miss 
Taylor, who then brought suit for damages. The court allowed 
the letter of applioation and the resolution or the trustees 
to be considered together as the written terms of the oon­
tract. The omission of Miss Taylor t s Christian name, was not 
regarded as a material objeotion to the oontract, as her 
identity could be established by parol evidenoe. But the 
38Berison v~ Township Silver Lake, 100 Iowa 328. 
39sparta ~ch. m. v. Mendall, 138 In~. 188, 37 N. E. 
604. 
alleged contract was held unenforceable on account of indef­
1niteness. Taken together the application and the order of 
the board, as the court pointed out: 
The contraot does not state when the sohools in the town 
of Petersburg began in the year 1901 - neither the day nor 
the month - or the grade appellant was to teach. or the pay
she was to reoeive. It cannot be claimed that they are def­
inite in these essentials to a complete contract. Where a 
statute prescribes a mode of exeroising a power, that mode 
must be adopted. Persons contracting with school trustees are 
bound to take notice that their powers are limited by law. 40 
However. the mere failure of the contract to state when 
the teacher's services are to begin or end does not render 
it unenforceable on aoeount of indefiniteness, since the law 
will	 imply, "That the servioes are to be rendered Within the 
sohool year and are to begin when the school board fixes the 
opening of the term.,,41 
It should be note~ tha~ the mere vote of a school board 
in favor of employing a oertain person as teaoher does not 
constitute a contract of employment with such person. As 
the supreme Court of California has deolared: 
The ballots were only 'an expression or cboioe on the 
part of the members casting them, and had no greater force 
or effeot than an oral vote would have had. At most they
amounted only to an offer of employment, which respondent
had a right to refuse and the board had a right to revoke 
or cancel at any time before acoeptanoe. 42 
40Taylor v. School Town of Petersburgh, 33 Ind. App. 
675, 72 N~ E. 159. 
41BUtcher v. Charles, et. al., 95 Tenn. 532, 32 S. W. 
631; Com. of Seotion sixteen v. Criswell, 6 Ala. 585; Crabb 
v. Sch. D~st., 93 Mo. App. 254; Denison v. Inhabitants of 
Vinal	 Haven, 100 Me. 136, 60 Atl. 798. 
42MallOY v. Board of Eduoation, 102 Cal. 642, 36 Pac. 
948. --	 ~ z 
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Of course if the teacher, in a letter of application 
had previously offered to teach, the board's vote would be 
an aoceptanoe of that offer. If the teacher is oareful to 
make his application in writing deta1led and definite, an 
acoeptanoe of it will form a oontract unobjeotionable from 
the standpoint of certainty. In such oases it is not nec­
essary to a completed contraot that the board notify the 
teacher of his election or that he notify it of his accept­
ance. 43 It follows from the above principles that where a 
teacher has been regularly employed by a school board, a 
refusal of the president to sign the contract, as required 
by the statute, does not affeot the validity of the contract. 44 
Manifestly, a valid oontraot must be mutual, certain, 
definite, and free from fraud and illegality, and must be 
legally authorized and exeouted and meet all the necessary 
requisites, both of the oommon law and the statutes. 
43weatherly v. Mayor, eto., of Chattanooga, Tenn.; 48 
S.	 W. 136.- ­
44School Dist. v. Edmonston, 50 Mo. App. 65. 
CHAPrER ITt
 
CONTRACTUAL POWERS OF THE SCHOOL BOARD
 
One objeot o~ this study is to determine the answer 
to such questions as the following: Who shall seleot and 
appoint the teachers? How are the limitations upon the 
appointive power determined and by whom? What discretion­
ary powers do they possess? May such boards impose addi­
tional rules and regulations upon qualified candidates? 
If a teaoher must enter into a oontraotual status in 
order to enter upon professional duties the question im­
mediately presses with whom must he contract. In the ear­
ly colonial days the people in town meetings voted to es­
tablish and support a school, and then voted to seleot the 
schGol master for it. Here the people hired the teacher. 
As schools grew and increased in size and importance, a 
distinction between lay and professional funotions in school 
control was gradually differentiated. The hiring of teach­
ers was one of the first professional funotions to be sub­
tracted from the people and assigned to a special group. 
These groups were reoognized by legis~atures and invested 
with statutory powers, chiet among which was the power to 
contract with the teaohers. 
The powers of the sohool oommittee as they were later 
designated, are presoribed and lim1ted by statute, and al­
so by suoh provisions of the oonstitution of the state as 
are self-enforoing. In ~ v. sc~ool D~strict the famil~ 
tar doctrine is olearly stated that a person entering into 
a contract for a school through its direotors must at his 
peril take notioe of the limited powers of the directors, 
and if he enters into a contraot with them in excess of 
their powers, no recovery thereon oan be had. l 
The doctrine that eduoation is a funotion of the state 
is well established in American Law. The state may vest 
here authority in a state board of education, or distribute 
it to county, township or city organization throughout its 
territory.2 That the state should maintain control of the 
oertifioation of teaohers, and not release this power to 
loo~ organizations was well illustrated in the Board of 
Eduoation of Galesburg v. Arnold. 3 In this oase t~e gen~ral 
lRudy v. School Distriot, 82 Iowa 682. 
2Q.Q..!7 v. Carter, 148 Ind. 467; Gunnison v. BOard of 
EducatIOn; 176 N. Y. 13; Kennedl v. MIller, 97 Cal. 429; 
State v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 458. 
3Board ot Eduoation of Galesburg v. Arnold, 121 Ill. 11. 
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sohool law provided that: 
No teaoher shall be entitled to any portion of the 
sohoolor township rund ••• who shall not at the time of 
his employment have a oertifioation of qualifioation ob­
tained under provision of this aot. 
It was urged that this general law had no applioation 
to Galesburg, as it existed under a speoial aot Whioh pro­
vided: 
The pUblic sohools of said district shall be under ex­
olusive management and oontrol of the board of education•••• 
It was olaimed that the speoial act gave Galesburg 
management over the power to appoint teaohers, that, there­
fore, it was an imp11ed power of the Galesburg board to de­
termine qualifioations of teaohers irrespeotive of the stat­
ute. The court deolared, and defined the word "management" 
thus: 
Management of the common sohools •••• relates to the oon­
duot of the sohool in imparting instruotion. The power to 
employ teaohers may have suffioient scope when limited to 
qualified teaohers under the law, •••• they are not given
the right to examine and pass upon qualifications as this 
power resides in the oounty superintendent. 
·Have the school authorities invested with the power 
ot employing teachers unlimited discretion as to the qual~ 
ifications of those qualified under the law, which they em­
ploy? The general view appears to be in the affirmative. 
Thus it is said: 
The board has the absolute right to deoline to employ 
or to re-employ any applicant for any reason whatever or ­
for no reason at all. It is immaterial whether the ~ppli­
oant is married or unmarried, is Of fair oomplexion or dark, 
is or is not a member ot a trades union, or whether no 
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reason is given for suoh refusal. 4 
Two judges in the same oase dissent tram this language, 
saying: 
A rule oan easily be imagined the adoption of whioh 
would be unreasonable, contrary to public policy, and on 
the faoe of it not calculated to promote the best interests 
and welfare of the sohools. In our opinion, courts would 
have the power, in the interests of the publio good, to 
prohibit the enforcement of such an arbitrary rule. 
The question is important, because teaohers may desire 
permanent tenure, or may have made contribution to pension 
funds. It there is no restriction on this power, trustees 
may Virtually dictate the domestic, social, political, and 
industrial affiliations of teachers. Especially is this 
true if, as has been held, a teaoher may validly agree not 
to do for a limited period what he has a legal right to do. 5 
The question arises, may school boards impose addi­
tional reqUirements, such as mental tests, examinations, 
residence, and experienoe? Perhaps this dootrine is best 
stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in the following terms: 
It may be oonceded that boards of education have pow­
er to pass rules and regulations governing their teaohing 
torce and that generally such mattexs are within their ex­
olusive disoretion, but the boards have no power to pass 
an unreasonable rule in violation o·f the statute or oon­
stitution. 6 . 
Local boards retain the power to determine the pro­
fessional status of the teachers they employ and may add 
4P~ple e~re~. Fursman v. City ot Chicago, 278 Ill. 
318, 116 N. E. 158. 
5Guilford Sohool Tp. v. Roberts, 28 Ind. App. 355, 62 
N.	 E. 711. 
6peoEle v. Harrison, 223 Ill. 540. 
to the eligibility requirements of the state, provided 
such additional requirements are reasonable and not in 
lieu of or in conflict With, the laws of the state.? 
Thus the right of a local board to require a teach­
er to pass an examination prescribed by the local exam­
ining committee in addition to the possession of a statu­
tory oertificate is upheld by the Appellate Court of Mis­
souri: 
It must be admitted that in the interest of a higher
educational qualification the defendant Qoard of directors 
had the right, in addition to having a statutory oertif­
ioate to require her to take an examination in which she 
should maintain a oertain standard of fitness, as a teach­
er. 8 
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and regulations of a more personal and local character than 
those usually implied under the term "professional require­
ments"? May local boards impose upon the applicant sex lim­
itations, religious qualifications, restriction upon resi­
dence or labor affiliations? 
The answer will depend upon the courtts interpretation 
of the discretionary power of school boards to select and 
appoint teachers. 
This wide disoretionary power is best stated in the de­
cision 0'1' the oourt in Yoeman v. Boardo,f 'Education: 
The statutes vest boards of education with power to 
appoint teachers for their sChools, and in the exeroise of 
this power· they cannot be interfered with by the courts un-ll 
less there is gross abuse of the discretionary power given. 
The discretionary power with regard to sex, is illus· 
trated in the case of Commonwealth ex rel., Scott v. Board 
of Eduoation. A sub-district board within the oity of 
Philadelphia had elected a oertain female teacher as prin­
oipal of a mixed grammar sohool. 12 The board of education 
notified the district board that the appointee was inelig­
ible for the position, citing their rules and regulations 
that "male teachers only shall be eligible for principal­
ship of a grammar school for boys or a mixed grammar 
school." The district board urged that the eleotion of 
the teacher by a distriot board was not subjeot to confir­
l1Yoeman v. Board of Eduoation, 13 Ohio C. C. 207. 
l2c;mmonwealth ex rel. Soott v. Board of Eduoation, 
187 Pa. st. 70;-40 Atl. 806. 
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mation of the board of publio eduoation and also urged 
that the disorimination against their appointee was oon­
trary to a oonstitutional guarantee of the state that: 
A woman twenty-one years of age and upwards shall be 
eligible to any offioe of oontrol and management under 
the sahool laws of the state. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in this oase held that 
the Board of Publio Eduoation of Philadelphia had the 
right to presoribe the qualifioations of teaohers, and in 
determining suoh qualifioations for difrerent kinds or 
sohools the board may take into aooount the question ot 
sex, and may determine that male teaohers only may be prin­
oipals ot oertain olasses of sohools. In so doing the board 
does not violate the oonstitutional guarantee beoause the 
ottioe of teaoher is not one of "oontrol and management". 
Teaohers are rather offioers of instruotion, and were not 
oontemplated in the oonstitutional guarantee in oontrover­
sy. 
In another Pennsylvania case the disoretion of the 
board in referenoe to sex is deolared.13 In this oase the 
board of eduoation refused to oertify a oertain woman as 
supervising prinoipal of a grammar sohool on the ground 
that she had not had the required experienoe as presoribed 
1n their rules and regulations, and further, that in the 
opinion of the board a man prinoipal was needed in the 
school. Again, the oonstitutional provision of the state 
13Commonwealth v. Jenks, 154 Pa. st. 368. 
guaranteeing no discrimination against women holding an ot­
tice ot oontrol and management under the school laws of the 
state was relied upon to deteat the retusal of the board 
of eduoation to appoint a woman to the ottioe of supervis­
ing prinoipal. The court in this oase went even further 
than in the preceding case, in upholding the disoretion 
ot the board in referenoe to sex. The following prinoiple 
was given: 
If it be oonceded that the ottice of supervising prin­
oipal is an ottice ot oontrol and management, within the 
meaning ot the oonstitutional provision •••• her eligibili­
ty does not take away or limit the disoretionary power of 
the board in determining who should be appointed••••We do 
not see that sex is an important issue in the determina­
tion ot this case. No woman should be exoluded trom any
position she is competent to till beoause ot her sex•••• 
no woman qualitied for supervising prinoipal should be re­
tused an appointment beoause of her sex alone. The ques­
tion of eligibility is one thing. The selection among a 
olass of eligibles is qUite another. Sex ought not to af­
teet the tirst, it may help under some circumstances to 
determine the last. 
The rules given for qualifioations tor a supervising 
prinoipal oame within the oontrol ot the board ot eduoa­
tion. They were reasonable rules and the board would not 
i~e~e~. 
Tbe religious belief of teaohers, or laok ot it, does 
not act as a restriction upon the exeroise of the wide 
disoretionary power of school direotors in their power of 
seleotion and appointment. On ~his poin~ the Illinois . 
Supreme Court says: 
The statute has not prescribed any religious beliet 
as a qualification for a teacher in the public schools. 
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The sohool authorities may seleot a teacher who belongs 
to any ohurch or no ohuroh as they may think best.14 
Again, in Hysons v. School Distriot the Supreme court 
of Pennsylvania deolares: 
Unquestionably these women are Catholios •••• believ­
ing fully in the distinctive oreed and dootrine of Cath­
olioism. But this does not disqualify them. our Con­
stitution negatives any assertion Of inoapaoity or in­
eligibility to offioe beoause of religious belief•••• 
If by law, any man or woman can be excluded from publio
offioe of employment because he or she is a Catholic that 
is a palpable violation of the spirit of the Constitution 
••••Men may disqualify themselves by crime, but the state 
no longer disqualifies beoause of religious be11ef.15 
A nice question as to the discretion of the board of 
education is raised in the so-called religious garb cases. 
There are two suoh outstanding cases, one in New York and 
one in Pennsylvania. The faots of eaoh are praotioally on 
all fours, but opposite deoisions are reaohed in eaoh jur­
isdiction by the oourts of highest resort. In the Penn­
sylvania oase the faots are essentially as follows. 15 Two 
sisters of the order of st. Joseph held regular certifi­
oates granted them in their religious names. A oontraot 
to teaoh in the publio sohools of Gallitzan Borough was 
issued to eaoh of these sisters in their religious names 
by the Board of Eduoation of Gallitzan. While teaohing 
in the publio schools they wore at all t !mes the familiar 
and distinctive garb of the order together with cruoifixes 
14Millard v. Board of Education, 121 Ill. 297, 10 
N. E. 669. 
15Hzson v. School District of Gallitzon, 164 Pa. st. 
629, 30 Atl. 482. 
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and rosaries of the order and seot. There was no evidence 
that they used the garb or insignia to attract particular 
attent ion to themselves, or endeavored to use them to im­
part religious or sectarian instruction. They were re­
quired by their vows to the church to wear such garb and 
such insignia. Children in the school addressed these 
teachers as Sisters. The evidence showed that the Board 
of Sohool Directors of Gallitzan Borough intended to employ 
none but Catholio Sisters in oertain rooms. It also ap­
peared in evidence that certain religious instruction· and 
exeroises of the Catholic church preoeded and followed the 
opening and closing of the public school session. Protestant 
children were not required to attend or participate in these 
exercises or instruction: The question at issue was: Did 
the instruction in the school become sectarian under the con­
ditions herein enumerated? The oourt held that it was not 
oalled upon to determine whether the direotors acted wise­
ly or not, but to determine under the law whether sec­
tarian instruotion had actually been given or was liable 
to be given in the public schools. The policy of the di­
rectors of Gallitzan in discriminating in favor of persons 
belonging to a particular class might indicate a repre­
hensible indifferenoe on the part of the directors to the 
polioy of the law to divorce all matters tending to seo­
tarianism from the pUblio schools. The court, however, 
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round it to be the policy of the school law of the state 
which lodges in boards discretionary powers to employ teach­
ers J not to interfere in the exeroise of that power unless 
it be arbitrarily exercised to the detriment of the school. 
This discretion, when it does not transgress the law, is 
not revi'ewable by the oourts. Referring to the finding of 
faot upon whioh the decision turned J Justioe Dean said: 
The dress is but an announcement of the fact that the
 
wearer holds a particular belief•••• Are the courts to de­

cide that the out of a man's coat or the color of a woman's
 
gown is sectarian teaching because they indicate a seotar­

ian religious belief?
 
The dissenting judge in this oase, however, reached an op­
posite conclusion in reference to the facts. Justice 
Williams said: 
They (Sisters) have oeased to be civilian or seoular
 
persons. They have become eoolesiastical persons known by
 
religious names and devoted to relig10us work •••• The ques~
 
tion presented on this state of facts is whether a school
 
that is filled with religious or eoclesiastical persons as
 
teachers •••• wearing their eoclesiastical robe and hung
 
about with the rosaries and other devices peculiar to their
 
ohurch and order is not necessarily dominated by sectarian
 
influence and obnoxious to the spirit of the constitution­

al provisions and school laws.
 
In the New York case referred tO J the state superinten­
dent of public instruction had direoted that teachers wear­
ing the garb peculiar to a religious order shall not be em­
ployed by a trustee of a school district or J ir employed, 
shall be dismissed unless the wearing of the garb is discon­
tinued. The court states, the question to be deoided is 
whether the disoretion of the state superintendent ooncerning 
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the wearing of a religious garb was a reasonable exercise 
thereof or not. The court held that the same rule of law 
was applicable to the state superintendent's discretion 
as was applicable to the school directors' discretion, and 
cites the case of Ra~linson v. Post as an authority in 
point. 16 In that oase the court points out that the sohool 
directors have power to classify scholars; to regulate 
their studies and their department; but that all such rules 
and regulations must be reasonable and oalculated to pro­
mote the objeots of the law. The court then addressed it­
self to the question of faot. Is it unreasonable to pro­
hibit the wearing of a religious garb in the public school? 
The court found that it was not. The opinion of the dis­
senting jUdge in the Pennsylvania case. was cited with ap­
proval. and in agreement with bim the court held that the 
wearing of a religious garb by a teacher within a public 
school may constitute sectarian influeance of the type pro­
hibited by law and public policy. The outstanding agree­
ment in these two opposite decisions is the declaratton of 
the doctrine that boards of education have wide discretion 
in the seleotion and appointment ot teachers in the pUblic 
schools. The point ot departure is on the interpretation 
of the facts; one court holds that the wearing of a relig­
ious garb was seotarian influence. and the other oourt holds 
that it was not. 
I6Rawlinson v. ~, 7~ Ill. 567. 
The question has been adjudicated in two states as 
to whether a board of eduoation may refuse appointment or 
reappointment to teachers affiliated with labor organizations. 
Like the preoeding questions of discretion in referenoe to 
sex, religion, and religious garb, this is pl~inly one of 
reasonableness of the discretionary power to be exeroised 
by boards of eduoation. In Frederick v. Owen, the resolu­
-
tions of the board treated affiliation with labor unions 
as eqUivalent to resignation by' the teaoher, and said that 
all teacher contraots or appointments to teach should con­
tain a stipulation to the effect that no teaoher should be 
appointed or reappointed who did not freely first assent 
to these requirements of the board. 17 The court held: 
Neither the superintendent nor any of his assistants 
nor any of the teachers have any vested right in the posi­
tion whioh they hold. The right to longer ocoupy these 
positions terminates at the end of the period for whioh 
the appointment has been made, and thereafter the right 
to oontinue therein depends upon the Judgment of the su­
perintendent and the board insofar as assistants and teach­
ers a.re ooncerned, and of the board alone as far as the 
superintendent is conoerned. It was neoessary that this 
power of selection, appointment and reappointment, should 
be vested somewhere, and the Legislature saw fit to vest 
it in the superintendent and the board of education. The 
statutes will be searched in vain to find any provision 
to the effeot that the superintendent and board may only
make selections and appointments when they are able to give 
reasons therefor that are satisfaoto~y to the courts, and 
the records in this oase will be searched in vain for evi­
denoe tending to show that any teacher has been appointed
who was not qualified for the position ~o which she was 
appointed•••• It being true that neither the superintendent 
nor the board is required by law to state the reasons to 
anyone for the seleotions made, can the court enumerate cer­
tain reasons as insufficient and then command the superin­
tendent and the board of education not to omit to appoint 
17Frederickv. Owen, 35 Ohio C. C. 538. 
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for these stated reasons, and then punish them for a con­
tempt if they fail ~o do so? ••• It is difficult to con­
ceive of anything that would be more oertainly produotive 
of confusion in practical applioation than the proposi­
tion that the courts may state to public officers the var­
ious grounds upon whioh they shall not detennine against
appointing an applicant for a position under the control 
of such officers. 
The oourt said such procedure would be 
•••• like attempting to define politioal affiliations 
which are not good grounds for refusal of public appoint­
ment and punish if denying appointment on political grounds. 
The court concludes with the statement of suggestive remedy 
in suoh cases: 
The members of the board of education are eleoted by
the people. If the people make mistakes in their selection 
of men to fill their important positions. the ballot box 
and not the court is the place to correct these errors. 
A similar oase arises in Chicago. 18 A rule of the city 
board of education prohibited any teacher from holding mem­
bership in a labor union or any organization of teaohers af­
filiated with a trade unio~ or federation.of trade unions. 
The role also provided that "any member of the eduoational 
department who shall be found gUilty of violation of any 
provisions of this rule shall be liable to dismissal from 
the service or to such lesser disoiplines as the board, in 
1ts discretion, in eaoh case, shall determine." Some thirty­
five hundred of the seven thousand teaohers were members 
of the Chicago Teachers Federation which was affiliated 
with a federation of trade unions. The oourt laid down the 
following rule: 
r8people ex rel.Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 
318. 
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No person has a right to demand that he or she shall 
be employed as a teaoher. The board has the absolute 
right to deoline to employ or reemploy an applicant for 
any reason whatever, of or for no reason at all. The board 
is responsible only to the people of the city from whom, 
through the mayor, the members have received their appoint­
ments. It is no infringement upon the constitutional rights
of anyone for the board to decline to employ him as a teach­
er in the school, and it is innnaterial whether the reason 
for the refusal to employ him is because the applicant is 
married or unmarried, is of fair complexion or of dark, is 
or is not a member of a trade union,'or whether no reason 
is given for such refusal. The board is not bound to give 
any reason for its action•••• Questions of policy are sole­
ly for the determination of the board and, when they have 
once been deter.mined by it, the courts will not inquire in­
to their propriety. 
Judges Farmer and Carter, while concurring with the oonclu­
sions reached in this opinion did not concur in all the 
reasoning of the opinion. They held as follows: 
This power does not, however, inolude the power to 
adopt any kind of an arbitrary rule for the employment of 
teachers it chooses to adopt, for a rule can easily be im­
agined, the adoption of which would be unreasonable, oontrary 
to publio policy, and on the fact of it not calculated to 
promote the best interest and welfare of the schools. 
May looal boards of school contr,ol limit or prescribe 
the residenoe or boarding locality of the public school 
teaoher? Will the courts hold such rules and regulations 
within the discretionary power of boards? The California 
Supreme Court held that a resolution of the Board of Edu­
cation of San Franoisoo, requiring teaohers and other sohool 
employees to reside within the city an~ oounty during their 
employment, is a reasonable exercise of power under a San 
Francisco oharter empowering the board of education to enforoe 
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necessary regulations for the government and effioienoy of 
the sohools .19 
This partioular oase, it seems, originated out of the 
desire of the plaintiff teacher to reslde with her parents 
in Berkley aoross the Bay. The court found that because of 
the inability ot the steamship oompanies to maintain a re­
liable sohedule, the board of eduoation was justified in en­
aoting the particular resolution in order to maintain the 
effioiency ot the schools. A holding of the Supreme Court 
of California that the Board of Eduoation of San Francisco 
may require its teachers to reside within the city is cited 
as example of the discretionary power given the sohool board. 
It was pointed out that suoh regulation does not unreason­
ably restrict a teacher's choice ot a residence and may well 
be for the direct benefit of the school. The oourt said: 
In contemplation of the fact that the teacher stands 
in 1000 parentis, that it may become her duty to devote 
her time to the welfare of her pupils, even outside ot 
school hours, that the hurrying for boats and trains can­
not be oonducive to the highest effioiency on the part of 
the teaoher, that tardiness may result from delays or ob­
structions in the transportation which a non-resident teach­
er must use, •••• all these, and many more oonsiderations 
not necessary to detail, certainly make the resolution in 
question a reasonable exercise of the power of the board 
of eduoation. 
In other jurisdictions, however, it has been found that 
it was unreasonable for the local board to prescribe resi­
denoe or boarding limitations. 20 The rule appears to be that 
19stuart v. Board of Education, 116 Cal. 10. 
20Home
-
v. Sohool District, ?5 N. H. 411, 35 Ohio C. C. 
538. . 
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a teaoher's residenoe or boarding plaoe may be presoribed 
by the employing board when it is neoessary to obtain a 
quality of servioe reasonably demanded by the board of ed­
uoation. 
Maya board contraot with a teacher for a term begin­
ning beyond the official term of some of the contracting 
board members? The prevailing rule as gathered from the 
authorities seems to be that, where there is no limit placed 
o~ the exeroise of power conferred upon school trustees or 
boards to oontraot with and employ teachers, a contraot by 
suoh trustees or board employing a teacher for a term to com­
mence or oontinue a~ter the expiration of the term of such 
trustees or board is valid and binding upon suooessors in 
offioe. The rule may be stated as follows: 
In the absence of express or implied statutory limita­
tions, a school board may enter into a contract to employ 
a teaoher or any proper officer for a term extending beyond
that of the board itself, and suoh contract if made in good 
~aith and without oollusion, binds the succeeding board. 
It has even been held that under proper circumstances a 
board may contract for the services of an employee to com­
menoe at a time SUbsequent to the end of the term of one 
or more of their members and subsequent to the reorganiza­
tion of the board as a whole, or even SUbsequent to the 
term of the board as a whole. But, the hiring for an un­
usual time is strong evidence of fraud and oollusion, which 
if present would invalidate the oontract. 2l 
Thus, it has been held that a school board may contraot 
to employ a teacher for a period to commence in the future 
after the expiration of the term of the board, and the fact 
is immaterial that the emploYment was for the purpose of 
2i~ v.- Board of Eduoation, 86 Okl. 265. 
forestalling the new board, where fraud on the part of the 
board making the contraot is not alleged. 22 The courts in­
variably hold that the board is a continuous body and, while 
the personnel changes, the corporation continues. unchanged. 
Such corporation has the power to contract, and its oon­
tracts are oontraots of the board and not of the individual 
members. 
Gardner v. yorth Litt~e Rock Special School District 
exemplifies the rule just stated. 23 In this oase the board 
engaged a superintendent for a period of two years, and al­
though a written contract was entered into, the board dis­
oharged the superintendent at the end of a year. - It was 
olaimed in this oase that the board could not make a valid 
oontract for a two-year term. The court held: 
The proper rule seems to be that unless a statute pre­
scribes a time limit upon the duration of suoh a contraot, 
the board may make a contract for a reasonable length of 
time, and the reasonableness of the contract is to be de­
termined by all the circumstanoes. The mere fact that there 
are changes in the personnel of the board during the life 
of the contract does not of itself render it unreasonable 
in duration of time. 
Again, in a Conneoticut case, the plaintiff was hired 
for a year by a school comm1ttee of the district and ,dis- , 
charged at the end of the third quarter by a new committee, 
ostensibly on the grounds that the employing committee had 
no .power to bind the district beyond their term of offioe. 
The court said: 
22School T?wn of Milford v. Ziegler, 1 Ind. App. 138. 
23Gardner v. North Little RO~~ Special School District, 
161 Ark. ~66. 
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It would be a novel and most mischievous dootrine that 
the offioers who manage the governmental oorporations of the 
state have no power to make a oontract whioh was not to be 
performed within the time for whioh they were elected to of­
fioe. 24 
Gates v. Sohool Distriot represents one of the best oon­
• 
sidered oases on the authority of boards to bind their suo­
oessors in office. 25 The plaintiff on May 3, 1888, was eleot­
ed superintendent of schools for one year beginning July 1, 
1888. On May 10, plaintiff aooepted position. The annual 
sohool board. eleotion was held on May 19, at whioh time new 
members were eleoted and failed to reoognize plaintifr as 
superintendent and prooeeded to the eleotion of another su­
perintendent. In this jurisdiotion the statute provided 
that: 
Boards of directors _shall have power to employ superin­
tendents of the schools. 
The oourt pointed out that this power is granted in the 
broadest of terms without plaoing any limitations or restrio­
tions on its exeroise. It was oontended in this oase, that 
the seleotion of the superintendent during eaoh year should 
be left to the exolusive oontrol of the partioular board for 
eaoh year. The oourt said in referenoe to this oontention: 
As a matter of policy an argument might be made on eith­
er side of that oontention. There is nothing in the law to 
sustain the affirmative. PUblio interests might suffer from 
unwise oontraots oovering an extended term in the future. 
They might surfer equallY for want of power to make a oon­
traot when a good opportunity offered. But with the ques­
tion of policy, we have no oonoern exoept so far as an aid 
24Wilson v. East Bridgeport, 36 Conn. 280. 
25Gates v. Sohool Distriot, 53 Ark. 468. 
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in asoertaining legislative intent •••• There is nothing 
in the act that the legilature intended either more or 
less than it said. We, therefore, conclude that the act 
furnishes an aocurate expression of legislative intent, 
and that there is no law that forbids the sohool board to 
make a contract for a superintendent for a term beginning 
after some members of the board go out o~ o~~i~e. 
The conclusion of this case is sustained by the weight 
of authority.26 
It may be pointed out that teachers, unlike the mem­
bers of the profession of law or medicine, in addition to 
being certified to by the state, must enter into a contract­
ual status in order to practice their profession. Therefore, 
it has been discovered from the investigations undertaken 
in this chapter, that a teacher must secure his contract to 
teach from a board of school directors who alone are auth­
orized by law to enter into such contracts with teachers. 
It seems to be a well settle law that in the absence of con­
trolling statutory provisions, the authority of the board to 
employ teachers includes the power to dismiss. Therefore, 
the courts have invariably ruled that, when a teacher was 
26Cleveland v. ~~, 88 Mich. 374; Chittenden v. School 
Distriot, 56 vt. 551; avis v. Board of EducatIon, 175 Mi'ch. 
105; Farrell v. School District, ~6 Mioh. 4j; Hemingway v. 
~oint School District, 118 Wis. 294; Renbelt v. schOOl Town, 
106 Ind. 478; Splaine v.' School District, 20 Wash. 74; schOOl 
District v. Morse, 62 Mass. l~l; Sparta Sohool Township v. 
Mendell, 138 Ind. 188; Silver v. C~~I~S, ? Wend (N. Y.) 
181; Teplan v. school Dlstrlct, 44 Mic • 500; Taylor v. 
School D strict, 16 Wash. 365; Town of Pearsoll v. Wools (Tex.) 
50 s. W. 95g;~Wait v. Hit, 67 N. Y. 36; Webster v. school 
District, 16 W~336; eeler v. Burke, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 168; 
WIlson v. School Distriot, 36 Conn. 280; Williams v. Buch, 
162 Ky. 143. ---­
dismissed or failed of reappointment, such teacher possessed 
no vested rights of contract. It has been seen, furthermore, 
that courts invariably construe a wide range of discretion­
ary power to boards of school directors on the ground that 
boards chosen by the people are the educational-policy-for.m­
ing body for the state, and not the oourts; and if boards 
abuse their discretion, the electorate have their remedy 
through the ballot box. 
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CHAPTER IV
 
Rro~OVAL A1~ DISlllSSAL OF TEACHERS
 
Up to this ·point we have investigated the conditions 
under which teachers beoome eligible to contract; are se­
lected and appointed to a teaching position; and enter in­
to and exeoute contracts. In this chapter the conditions 
under which a teacher may be removed, dismissed or dis­
oharged will be oonsidered. It will be necessary to in­
quire into the authority and right ot school boards to re­
move or dismiss, and the conditions under which the right 
may be exercised, including the mode of removal or dismis­
sal. 
The ter.ms "removal" and "dismissal!t are otten used in­
terohangeably. Striotly, the word "removal't in referenoe 
to teachers' contracts implies some personal dereliotion of 
duty, while the more inclusive term "dismissal" means ter­
mination of contract tor whatever cause. 
In the absence of expressed statutory provisions in 
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reference to the removal or dismissal of teachers there is 
considerable authority that boards of education have the 
implied power to dismiss for sufficient cause, which at com­
mon law, would justify an employer in discharge of his 
servant. In short, the right to employ a teacher carries 
with it by necessary implication the authority to dismiss 
a teacher for adequate cause. l 
To what extent at common law may this implied power 
of dismissal be exercised? A dictum in Loehr v. Board, of 
Eduoation would indioate that this power was unlimi te,d, for 
the court said in this oase: 
In the absenoe of a constitutional or statutory limi­
tation, boards of eduoation may exercise an unlimited dis­
cretion 1n the employment and dismissal of teaohers as well 
as their transfer and assignment. 2 
In K11derhouse v. Brown, although there was no statu­
tory authority to dismiss, yet it was held that the trustee 
had power to discharge a teacher before the expiration of 
his oontract at any time, even though he was properly qual­
ified in all respects and performed his services in a pro­
per manner •.3 On the other hand, there is found the case 
whioh holds that in the absenoe of statutory authority to 
dismiss, the sohool board has not the power to discharge a 
teaoher for cruel treatment and profane and obusive language 
- IBa~s v. state, 6 Neb. 167; Freeman v. Bourne, 170 
Mass. 28 , 39 L.R.A. 510; Kilderhouse v. Brown, 17 Ab. (N.C.)
401. ­
2Loehr v. Board of Education, 12 Calif. App. 671. 
3Kilderhouse v. Brown, 17 N.C. 401. 
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toward pupils. 4 There is found a third oase in which the 
Wisoonsin Court said: 
We think the only power which the board has to dis­
charge a teacher 1s the power which they may exercise on 
behalf of the district when the teacher is guilty of some 
breaoh of his contract - or when the teacher has lost all 
right to teaoh by reason of the annulment of his certifi­
cate in the way prescribed by statute. 5 
This case assumes that the right to employ a teacher 
oarries with it by neoessary implioation, the authority to 
dismiss such teacher, still suoh authority to dismiss is 
limited to just and suffioient cause and said board must 
act with disoretion and judgment. However, where the stat­
ute allows the board to remove for certain specified caus­
es, the board may so contract with the teacher as to gain 
the right to remove for other causes6 although some cases 
are to the contrary.7 
It is possible to reserve in the contract of employ­
ment the right to dismiss the teacher at will or if his serv­
ioes are unsatisfactory, especially if no statute specifies 
the causes for which teachers may be removed. However, suoh 
right must be exeroised in good faith; and in case the jury 
deemed the dismissal improper, the teacher can recover damages 
4Arnold v. School Dist., 78 Mo. 226. 
5Tripp v. School Dist., 50 Wis. 651. 
6Sohool District v. Gautier, 13 Okla. 194, 73 Pac. 954; 
Sohool Direotors v. Ewin~ton, 26 Ill. App. 379; Wallace v. 
School Diat., 50 Neb. ~ 17 , 69 N. W. 772. 
7Thompson v. Gibbs, 97 Tenn. 489, 37 S. W. 277, 34 L.R.A. 
548; People ex. reI. Murp~ v. Maxwell, 177 N. Y. 494, 63 
N. E. 1092; Tripp v. scho~ Dist. No.3, 50 Wis. 651, 7 N.W. 
324. 
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for a breach of contract. 8 
The principal oauses justifying dismissal of a teach­
er at any time regardless of contract are (1) immoral oon­
duet; (2) unprofessional conduct; (3) insubordination; (4) 
negligence; (5) inefficiency and incompetency. 
Actual or reputed immorality of a teacher is suffic­
ient cause for dismissal. 9 A teacher may be dismissed be­
fore his services begin, but the board must prove that it 
is for immorality charge and not a dismissal on account of 
inoompetenoy.lO 
The immorality on the part of a teacher warranting his 
removal does not need to be in connection with his school 
work. 11 It is not necessary on acoount of it his lioense 
to teaoh be revoked. As was stated by the Chief Justice 
Tindall: 
The general want of reputation in the neighborhood, the 
very suspioion that he has been guilty of offenses Fttated 
against him in the return, the common belier of the truth 
of such oharges amongst the neighbors, might ruin the well 
being of the school if the master were continued in it, al­
though the charge itself might be untrue and at all events ~ 
the proof of the facts themselves insuffioient before a jury.L" 
Indictment of a school superintendent for adultery was held 
suffioient grounds for dismissal although the verdict was 
afterward set aside and the prosecution dismissed, since not 
SHen61 Sohool Twp. v. Meredith. 32 Ind. App. 607, 70 N.E. 393; Schoo Distriot v. Gautier, l3 Okla. 194, 73 Pac. g54. 
9Sohool Dist.-of Ft. Smith ~. Mau~, 53 Ark. 471, 145 
s.w.	 669; Trustees of State Normal v. ~oper, 150 Pa. st. 78. 
10Argenta Sohool Dist. v. Striokland, 152 Ark. 215, 238 SW9. 
IlT1~gt et. ale v. Vaughn, 17 Ill. App. 347. 
l2Ew_in v. Independent Sch. Dist., 10 Idaho 102, 77 Pac. 222. 
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only "good character but good reputation" is necessary to 
the greatest usefulness in his position.13 
Obviously unprofessional conduot might be immoral but 
in some instanoes might be grounds for dismissal. Thus a 
teacher's advocacy before his class of the election of a 
particular candidate for public office is unprofessional 
conduot warrantiD& suspension, as it introduces into the 
school questions foreign to its purpose, stirs up· student 
strife and disrupt,s disoipline. 14 Where a Quakeress, a 
school teaoher stated that she would not uphold her oountry 
in resisting invasion, that she did not want to help the 
u.s. in oarrying on war, and would not urge her pupils to 
do Red Cross Work or bUy thrift stamps, it was held that 
the board of superintendents dismission of her on the grounds 
of unprofessional conduct would not be disturbed by the 
oourt. 15 
In holding that the discharge of a superintendent for 
alleged insubordination and politioal activities was wrong­
ful, the Supreme Court of Arkansas indulges in a discussion 
of the political rights of teachers. 
There is no contention that the plainti~f was lacking, 
to any degree in moral charaoter, or habits, or health, or 
that he was not up to a high standard of ability for the 
disoharge of the duties of his office, nor that he was in 
any degree inefficient. The sole contention is that he 
13Freeman v. Town of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 39 L.R.A. 
510. 
Pac. 
l4Goldsmith v. 
783. 
Bd. 
. 
of Education, 63 Cal. App. 141, 225 
15McDowell v. Bd. of Ed., 172 N. Y. S. 590. 
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persistently pursued policies in hostility to the views of 
the members of the board, and that his overzeal in the pol­
itical affairs of the district was detrimental to the school 
interests and rendered him unfit to disoharge his duties. 
It is shown that the plaintiff favored a somewhat am­
bitious plan for the enlargement or the school properties, 
for expensive buildings and grounds, and that in this pol­
ioy he was supported by an even half in numbers, of the 
board of directors, but was opposed by the other half. All 
the witnesses who testified on this subject stated that there 
was lack of harmony between the superintendent and the board, 
but never any harsh feelings or offensive conduct. The most 
that the evidenoe shows on this sUbjeot is that the plain­
tiff adhered persistently to his views with respect to his 
plans for improvement in opposition to the wishes of at 
least half of the members of the board. It shows that he 
was not disposed to treat the deoision of the board as fin­
al, in the sense that he ceased to attempt to impress his 
views upon the board but there is no evidence to show that 
there was any obstructive tactics on the part of the plain­
tiff, nor any overt act of insubordination. Certainly they 
are not denied the right of a reasonable amount of activ­
ity in all public affa1rs. 16 
Dismissal for insubordination would include the case 
Of the teacher, dismissed because she refused to comply with 
a reasonable regulation of the board as, for instance, a 
rule	 requiring teaohers to be vaocinated. 17 So, too, a teach­
er may be discharged for refusing to receive back a pupil 
whom	 he has suspended after his action has been overruled 
by the sohool direotors. 18 Refusal to obey the rules of the 
board prohibiting the reading of the Bible in the public 
SOhools. 19 was held to be suffioient cause for dismissal. 
Cross neglect or inattention to duty is a cause for 
16Gardner v. North Little Rook sohool Distriot, 161 
Ark.	 466, 257 S. W. 73. 
17Tyndall v. HiSh School Community, 19 Pa. Sup. Ct. 232. 
18Leddy v. Bd. of Ed., 160 Ill. APP. 87; Parker v. School 
pistrict, 73 Tenn. 525. ~ 
19Board or Ed. v. Pulse, 7 Ohio N. ·P. 58. 
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dismissal for negligenoe. 20 Continued tardiness and indif­
ferences to needs of ohildren were held to be good grounds 
for dismissal. 21 
Failure to renew a license to teach was held not to 
be cause for dismissal unless provision was made for ter­
mination of the contract in such event. 22 Nor was tail­
ure to perfor.m janitorial duties, such as carrying fuel, 
making fires, and preparing building for occupancy consid­
ered negligence in perfor.mance of duty in absence of stipu­
lation in teacher's contract to perform such work. 23 
Incompetency in a teacher generally oonnotes teaching 
inability, either from insufficient learning or incapacity 
to impart learning to others, and is therefore a cause for 
dismissal. 24 Lack of requisite qUalities of temper or dis­
oretion in an otherwise good teacher-was held to be stat­
utory cause for dismissal. 25 Failure to manage and eontrol 
the sohool may constitute an inefficiency suffioient for 
dismissal. 26 However, inability of a physioal training 
teacher to act as football ooach in tne Rockwell v. school 
20Curkett v. school Dist., 15~ Wis. 14~; Holden v. 
Shrewsburg, 38 Vt. 529; Morley v. Power, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 21~; 
School Directors v. Hudson, 88 Ill. 563; Smith v. Dist. Twp.
of Knox, 42 Iowa 522. 
2ICarver v. Battle Creek, 113 Mich. 524. 
22Sohool District v. Ozmer, 81 Ark. 194; Stimson v. Bd. 
of Education, 165 N. Y. 431. 
23School Dist. v. Bear, 106 Okla. 172. 
24Crawfordsvil~e v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200; loreman v. sohool 
Dist., 81 Ore. 587;- Holden-v. School Dist., 38 Ute 52~. 
25Robinson v. School Directors, 96 Ill. App. 604. 
26Eastman y. Rapids Distriot, 2 Iowa 5~0. 
District in Oregon was held as not valid ground for dis­
charge of a high school athletic director. 27 In other words, 
apart from immorality, the personal defeats of a teacher to 
justify his removal must militate directly against his sohool 
work, rather than his popularity in the oommunity. ThUS, 
chewing tobacco and spitting the juice through the screen 
windows of the schoolhouse does not justify his disoharge. 28 
School offioials may not remove a teacher for matters be­
yond their jurisdiotion, and not relating to the school; 
thUS, a school board may not fix a teacher's boarding place 
and dismiss him because he refuses longer to board there. 29 
In the absence of a statute or a '\Ialid contract permi t­
ting it, can a female teacher in the public schools be re­
moved on account of her marriage? The courts of final jur­
isdiotion have uniformly answered the question in the neg­
ative. The idea that marriage does not necessarily disqual­
ify a woman for teaching has been upheld, and any other rule 
is regarded as arbitrary and unreasonable. 30 
A board of education may ~efuse to employ a married 
woman as a teacher, just as it may refuse to employ one who 
is not a normal or university graduate. Moreover, unless 
~Rockwell v. School Dist., 109 Ore. 486.
 
280ttinger v. School District, 157 Ark. 82, 247 S. W.
 
789. 
29Horne v. School District, 75 N. H. 411, 75 Atl. 431. 
30Edwards, I. N., "Marriage as the Legal Cause for 
Dismissal of Women Teachers lt , Elementary School Journal x:i0T 
(May, 1925), 692-695. 
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a statute rules otherwise, the board may employ a woman 
teacher only upon condition that she will remain unmar­
ried during the term; and upon her failure to observe this 
condition, it may rescind her contract. 51 However, an il­
legal regulation cannot become a part of a teacher's con­
tract; therefore, where by statute a school board is auth­
orized to remove a teacher only for "gross misconduct, in­
subordination, neglect of duty, or general inef\fioiency," 
it cannot by regulation provide that the marriage of a teach­
er vacates her position. 32 
A strong statement of this point is found in an opin­
ion of the Supreme Court of Oregon: 
We prefer to proceed with the ~nquiry and determine 
whether the single faat of marriage can in advance and alone 
be said to be a reasonable cause for dismissal. Efficien­
cy and competency of teachers and the welfare of the schools 
are, of course, consummations ~devoutly to be wished". If 
a teacher becomes inerficien~ or fails to perform her duty~ 
or does some act which of itself impairs usefulness, then 
a good or reasonable cause for dismissal would exist. The 
aat of marriage, however, does not, of itself furnish a 
reasonable cause. That the marriage status does not neoes­
sarily impair the competency of all women teachers is con­
ceded by the school authorities when they employ married 
women as they are even now doing to teach in the schools of 
this district. 
The reason advanced for the rule adopted by the board 
is that after marriage a woman may devote her time and at­
tention to her home rather than to her school work. It would 
be Just as reasonable to adopt a rule that if a woman Joined 
51Guilford School TwJ2. v. Roberts, 28 Ind. App. 555, 
52 N. E. ill. ­
32people ex. _reI. Murphy v. Maxwell, I?? N. Y. 494, 
59 N. E. 1092. - ­
5-1 
a church, it would work an automatic dismissal on the imag­
ined	 assumption that the church might engross her time, 
thought, and attention to the detriment of the school. 33 
In oases in the states of West Virginia34and New York,35 
where the statute provides certain charges for dismissal, 
the Court of Appeals held that the board of eduoation had 
no authority to make suoh a by-law under the terms of their 
oharter. 
A promise not to marry is not legally binding on t,he 
teaoher acoord~ng to the great weight of authority. A con­
tract in general restraint of marriage is void because it 
is contrary to publio policy. 
Courts refuse to enforce or reoognize certain classes 
of acts because they are against publio policy on the ground 
that they have a misohievous tendency, and are thus injur­
ious to the interests of the state, apart from illegality 
or 1mmoralitYi a contraot in restraint of marriage is of 
this nature.5o 
Where the restraint upon marriage is a mere incident 
to the main object and purpose of the contraot, the courts 
as a	 rule hold that the contract is not void in all of its 
terms, but only with respect to the promise not to marry.57 
33Richards v. District School Board, 78 Ore. 621, 153 
Pac.	 482-. - ­
34Jameson v. Board of Education, 74 W.Va. 389, 81 S.E.1126. 
35people ex. reI. Murphy v. Maxwell, 177 N.Y. 494, 69 
N. E. 1092. 
36White v. Equitable Nuptial Benefit Union, 76 Ala. 251; 
Chalfant v. Payton', "91 Ind. 204; Lowe v. Doremes, 84 N.J. Law 
658, 49 L.B.A. g32; ~ v. King, 63 Ohio 363, 59 N.E. Ill. 
37Crowder-Jones v. Sullivan, 9 Onto L.R. 27; Fletcher v. 
Osburn, 282 Ill. 142, 118 N.E. 446; ~ v. ~, 63 ohio st. 
363, 59 N.E. Ill. For contrary opiniOn - Lowe v. Doremes, 84 
N. J. Law 658, 87·Atl. 459.	 --=­
It would seem, therefore, that a provision in a teacher's 
contract restricting her right of marriage is void and w1th~ 
out effect. 
No court of final jurisdiction it seems, has yet passed 
on the oonstitutionality of a statute specifically stipu­
lating marriage as a course for dismissal of women teach­
ers. In a number of cases, however, laws have been upheld 
which aU~horized boards to dismiss at pleasure. 38 
It may be said then that the dismissal of teachers be­
oause of marriage is regarded by the oourts as unreasonable. 
Should a teaoher misxepresent her marriage status, her con­
traot would be void because it was fraudulently obtained. 
Where a teacher promises in her contract not to marry, that 
provision in the oontract is without effeot because it is 
contrary to pUblio polioy. 
A statute may g1ve a sohool board the power to dismiss 
a teacher without giving him any notice of the charges 
against him or any trial thereon. 39 
The statutes of most of the states, however, provide 
38people v. New York Board of Education, 23 N. Y. S. 
473; Jones v. Nebraska City, 1 Neb. 176; Gillan v. Board 
o~ Regents, 88-'11s.1042, 24 L. R. A. 336. 
39People ex. relet Everett v. Hubbell et al, 38 App. 
Div. N. Y. 194, -56 N. Y. S. ;peo~le v. Board of Educ~tion, 
114 N. Y. App. Div. 1, 99 N. Y. • 737, 80 N. E. 1116; 
People ex rel e , Keyser v. Board of Education, 66 N. Y. S. 
149; People ex rei., Gorlitz v.Board of Education, 52 
N. Y. Superior ct. 520. 
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mouth and tie his hands. He oomes into this oourt of ap­
peal, and asks whether he may be lawfully tried, oonvioted, 
and sentenoed without so muoh as notioe that he is aooused. 
A good oharaoter is a neoessary part of the equipment
of a teaoher. Take this away, or blaoken it, and the doors 
of professional employment are praotioally olosed against 
him. Before this is·done there should be at least, a hear­
ing, at whioh the acoused may show that the things alleged 
are not true, or if true, are susceptible of an explanation 
oonsistent with good morals and his own professional fidel­
ity. We think it is plain, too plain for serious disous­
sion that the aotion of the trustees was irregular and un­just to the appellant. 43 
Considering the removal of a teacher without a hearing, 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee has said: 
It 1s a rule of oommon law, in aocord with the plainest 
principles of justioe, that to warrant the removal of an of­
ficial under a limited power specific charges should be made 
and all witnesses in the matter be sworn. 44 
Where a teaoher is entitled to notice of the reasons 
for his dismissal, a letter saying that the trustees believe 
it for the best interests of the school that his services 
be dispensed with is not suffioient. 45 
The aotion of trustees in dismissing a teaoher without 
a hearing is waived by his appearing and asking for and be­
ing granted a hearing, whioh results in a finding that he 
is guilty of the oharges against him. 46 A trial of oharges 
against a teacher by the board of directors is not objeot­
ionable on the ground that they are acousers rather than 
43Truste~s of state Normal Sohool v. Cooper, 150 Pa. 
st. 78, 24 Atl. 348. . 
44Morley v. Powers at a~., 10 Lea (Tenn.) 21~, 73 Tenn. 
691. 
45Underwood et·al., v. Board of School Commissioners, 
103	 Md. 181, 63 Atl. 221. 
46Kellison v. School DistI1..ct, 20 Mont. 153, 00 Pao. 
421. 
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judges, or beoause of their prejudice, whenever they con­
stitute the only tribunal authorized to try such charges. 47 
But where charges are filed against a teacher, a director 
who is a personal enemy of the accused and the "prime mover" 
of the charges against him, and who has announced his in­
tention to join in a finding of guilty and in removing the 
accused, no matter what the evidence may be, is inoompetent 
by reason of his prejudice to participate in the trial of 
suoh charges. 48 
With regard to the right of a teacher to have the oourts 
review his alleged. improper dismissal, the attitude of many 
oourts is well expressed by the Supreme Court of Idaho,4~ as 
follows: 
After an examinatlon of the various authorities cited 
by respective oounsel, as well as others, we conclude that 
the general principal running through all of them is that 
where the power to remove is restrioted or limited to cer­
tain reasons or causes, the final determination as to wheth­
er the case falls within any of these causes rests with the 
oourts, and may be reviewed or inqUired into by them; and 
that, on the other hand, where the power is general, unlim­
ited, and unrestricted, and is once exercised, it cannot 
and will not be questioned or examined into by the oourts. 
Many cases50 ooncur with the above dootrine; but it is 
" 4?~Vhite v. Wohlenburyz et al., 113 Iowa 236, 84 N. W. 
1026. 
48State v. Board of Eduoation, 19 Wash. 8. 
49Ewin v. Independent School District, 10 Idaho 102, 
77 Pao.~. 
50Board of Directors v. Burton, 25 Ohio st. 421; Board 
of EducatIon v. Stotlar, 95 Ill. App. 250; Finch v. Fr~o~ 
tfifnal School DistrIct, 225 Mich. 674, 196 N. W. 532;-Feople 
ex r~l. Everett v. Hubbell et al., 38 App. Div. N. Y. 194, 
55 N. Y. S." 642; Smith v. Bergevin et al., 128 Wash. 488, 
223 Pao. 593; 35 Cyclopedia of Law 1095. 
not believed that suoh dismissal is conclusive whenever 
traud, corruption, or oppression eXists. 51 or whenever any 
abuse of discretion is shown. 52 Under some statutes a teach­
er who is aggrieved by the aotion of the board in removing 
or dismissing him has an appeal to higher school officials, 
such as a county or a state superintendent of public instruo­
tion, whose decision generally is final as to questions of 
fact and not sUbjeot to review by the courts;53 and if such 
an appeal is not done immediately, or in a reasonable time. 
the teacher's dismissal becomes final. 54 
A teacher may be removed from his position for reasons 
in no wise dependent upon the dismissal grounds heretofore 
discussed. These dismissals might be listed as indirect dis­
missals not due to "cause". Thus. the necessity for the 
abolition of a teaohing position. the eXigency of an insuf­
tioient ~uota of pupils, lack of funds, and the transfer or 
reassignment of a teaoher to another position. are often in­
direot causes of a teacher's removal from a given position. 
What are the teaoher's rights under suoh ciroumstanoes? 
It sometimes happens that a teacher's servioes are no 
longer needed beoause of a change in conduct of the schools. 
51School Dist. v. Davies, 69 Kans. 162. 76 Pac. 409. 
52Finch v. Fractional School Dist •• 225 Mich. 674, 196 
N. W.	 532; Gillan v. Board of Re~ents, 88 Wis. 7. 58 N. W. 
1042;	 state v. Hulder, 78 Minn. t4. 81 N. W. 532. 
53Jackson v. Independent School P1st. 110 Iowa 313. 81 
N. W.	 590; Kline v. Grannis. 48 Atl. 560; People ex rel. 
MurphZ	 v. Board of Education. 3 N. Y. S. 177. 
4Harkness v. Hutcheson. 90 Tex. 383, 38 S. W. 1120. 
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Boards under statutor,r authority to reorganize or modify the 
oonduct of a sohool find it necessary to abandon certain 
teaching positions, thereby acoomplishing the discharge of 
teaohers who otherwise would not have been dismissed for 
oause. Thus, it was held that the board of eduoation in the 
City or New York not only was authorized under the statute 
to establish evening schools, but also was authorized in its 
disoretion to ohange the system of conducting them, and, if 
the results of the Change involved the abolition of the for­
mer position of principal, suoh prinoipal had no reoourse 
for the retention of said position. 55 
Even in tenure jurisdictions where a teacher serves dur­
ing the term of good behavior, or until removed for cause, 
boards under statutory authority may abolish old positions 
and create new ones, perfeot oonsolidation, or economize in 
the management of the sohools in the reduotion ot the teach­
ing foroe. 56 
Again, it has been held that a teacher might be dis­
missed before the expiration of his oontraot, where the dis­
trict tailed to enroll the statutory quota ot pupils. 57 
Authority is divided as to whether a ~eacher hired 
for a definite term may be dismissed when the funds of the 
b5Cussaok v. Board of Education, 174 N. Y. 136; O'Leary 
v.	 Board of Eauoation, 174 N. Y. 511. 
56Bates v. Board ot Education, 139 Calif. 145; Loehr 
v. Board of EducatIon, 12 Ca1if.App. 671; People v. Board
 
of Eduoation, 99 N. Y. S. 737; Tho~pson v. Board of Eduoa­

tion, 121 N. Y. S. 491.
 
---- 57Weatherly v. Board of Eduoation, 48 S. W. 136.
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d1;st:rict become exhausted. 58 The issue turns on the power 
of the boards to exceed the debt limit or the appropriation 
authorized, for the purpose of keeping open a school. In 
Ril~y v. School bistrict it was said that in order to make 
it appear that the contract with the teacher is ultra vires 
on the part of the board, it must appear that not enough 
revenue was "provided" to continue the school longer, and 
not merely that not enough was collected and turned over to 
the treasurer of the school board. In general, it may be 
said that a teacher will not be dismissed for lack of funds, 
if there are any legal means by which the necessary funds 
. d 59oan b·e ra1se • 
Another case of indirect dismissal has been observed 
where a teacher is transferred or reassigned in such manner 
as to defeot his statutory right to removal for cause only. 
This becomes an important matter in a tenure jurisdiction 
where teachers hold positions for life unless removed for 
cause. Thus it has been held that the removal of a teacher 
may be accomplished by the transfer of a teaoher to a posi­
tion involving less pay ·and rank, or by removal from a higher 
to a lower grade. 50 
58Collier v. Peacock, 93 Tex. 255; Harmony School Town­
ship v. Mopre, 80 Ind. 275; JiY v. School Districl, 24 Mont. 
219; Morie! v. Power, 10 Lea T~nn.) 219; Rudy v. dchool 
District, 0 Mo. Ap~. 113; ~chool District~;-Walker~ 2 
Houst. 21; Wolf v. ~chool DIstrict, 27 L.R.A. (N. s. 891. 
59Ranch v. Chapman,· 15 Wash. 558, 35 L.R.A. 407,58 
Am. st. Rep. 52. 
50Fairchild v. Board of Education, 107 Calif. 92; Ken­
~ddY v. Board of Education~ 82 Calit.483; People v. Boara-of 
E ucation, 174 N.Y. 159; In Re GIese, 57 How. Prac.(N.Y.) 372. 
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that a teacher shall not be discharged for oause before the 
end of his term without the preferment of charges agains~ 
him, due notice, and an opportunity to be heard. 40 
In most of the cases dealing with the dlsmissal of teach­
ers, their right independent of statute, to receive notice 
of the charges against them and a hearing in reference to 
the same has not been decided; but a tew cases have assert­
ed that they have this right without referring to any stat­
ute as giving it,41 although there is authority to the con­
trary.42 ThUS, without basing its decision on a statute, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a principal 
of a normal school, without objection, cannot be regularly 
discharged by the board of trustees tor immoral oonduct with­
out a hearing. The court stated: 
The appellant was summarily ejeoted from his position 
about the middle of the year for which he had been regular­
ly elected. When he asked ror a reason for such treatment, 
he was pointed to his conviction on four distinct charges, 
of immoral conduct, spread upon the minutes of the board of 
trustees. When he denied the regularity of such action a 
Gourt of equity was appealed to by the trustees to close this 
40Benson v. Dist. Township of Silver Lake, 100 Iowa 328, 
69 N. W. 419; ClarR v. Wild. Rose Dis~rict, 4? N. D. 297, 182 
N. W. 307, 35 Cyc. 1093; Curttriglit v. Independent School 
Dist., 111 Iowa 20, 82 N. W. 444; Ewin v. Indetendent School 
District, 10 Idaho 102, 77 Pac. 22~nhabltan s of Shearmont 
v. Farwell, 3 Me. 450; MoKenzie v. BoarQ of Education, I cal. 
App. 4ITt, 82 Pao. 392; Morley v. Powers et al., 10 Lea (Tenn.) 
219, 72 Tenn. 691. 
41Brown v. Owen, 75 Miss. 319, 23 So. 35; Morlet v. Powers et al., 7~nn. 691; Field v. The Commonweal h 32 
Pa. 4?8; Trustees of state Nor.mal School v. Cooper, 156 Pa. 
st. 78, 24 Atl. 348. 
42Ewin v. Independent School District, 10 Idaho 102, P7 
Pac. 222. 
Suoh transfers or reassignments are held to be de facto 
d1sndssals. In the California oases, a teacher was granted 
a leave of absence by the board of eduoation. During her 
absence the position was filled by another teacher. Upon 
her return she was assigned to a lower grade at a lower sal­
ary. This was held to be an unlawful removal of a teaoher 
without oause. A later California case, Loehr v. Board of 
Education, appears to hold to the contrary. 
The legislature certainly intended to leave suoh free­
dom of action in a board of eduoation as would permit it in· 
its disoretion to make such assignment or transfer as is 
complained of in this case. 51 
The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, has held that the 
transfer of a permanently employed teacher was not equivalent 
to a dismissal. 52 The transfer from a prinoipalship to an­
other school as instructor was, within the disoretion of the 
board, without a neoessity for notioe and hearing. 
61Loehr v. Board of Eduoation, 12 Calif. App. 571. 
62Alexander v. Sohool District, 84 Ore. 172. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONTRACTUAL POWERS OF THE TEACHER 
A consideration of the powers of the teacher should en­
able -the teacher better to create and to protect his own in­
terests thereunder. In view of the preceeding ohapters, 
~his ohapter Will attempt to give, the privileges of the 
teacher under contraot: his right of oompensation; the re­
medial prooesses acoessible to the dismissed teaoher; cer­
tain types of remedies, suoh as appeal, review by the courts, 
aotion for damages, and mandamus for reinstatement. 
When a contract is entered into by competent authority, 
it is prima facie valid, and the burden of showing it in­
valid is upon the district. l As was shown in Chapter I, 
~ 
when the oontract is to be written, as prescribed by statute, 
an oral one is insufficient, and the teacher is presumed to 
know of such statutes. 2 It should not be concluded, however, 
lArmstron~ v. School Dist., 38 Mo. App. 169; Webster v. 
School Dist., 6. Wis. 336. 
2Taggart v. School Dist., 96 Or. 422, 188 Pac. 408. 
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merely beoause a school board has made an oral contract 
with a teacher, when the statute requires a written one, 
that it can thereby escape liability for his servicesj for 
the acceptance of part performance is a ratifioation of 
the 0 ont raot. 3 
A teacher who has rendered services to a distriet may 
reoo~er reasonable compensation therefor, even though he 
had no contract or agreement with the board in regard there­
to, for the district, "will not be permitted to avail it­
self of the fruits of his labor and then refuse to pay for 
it."4 
If the trustees repudiate an alleged contract, exeout­
ed in their private oapacity only, before the teacher has 
entered upon the performanoe of his duties thereunder, the 
teaoher necessarily is without remedy against the district, 
beoause there is here no ratification of the contraot by the 
district. 5 
It is illegal to dismiss a teacher for inoompetenoy 
before he has rendered servioes, where he has a proper cer­
tifioate and has been employed by the board with the know­
ledge of his qualifications, since he has the legal right 
to begin teacher, and have his competency determined by the 
servioes rendered. 6 
-335 eyc. 1085. 
4Smith v. Sch. Dist. 
5McGinn v. Willey, 
#64, 
6 Cal. 
89 Kans. 
App. 111, 
225, 131 Pac. 
91 Pac. 423. 
557. 
6Argenta School D1st. v. Strickland, 152 Ark. 215, 238 
S. W•. 9; Farrell v. School D1st., 93 Mioh. 43, 56 N. W. 1053. 
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Where a contract for teaching states that a teaoher 
has a second grade license, there is no warranty that it 
will continue such. Consequently, the fact that before 
school began he took an eX~ination to teach, as his li~ 
cense had nearly expired, wherein he received only a third 
grade certificate does not justify the recision of the 
teacher's contract.? 
In some jurisdiction the courts hold that it is in­
oumbent upon the licensed teacher to hold a certificate 
covering the full term of his employment at the time of 
entering upon the contract to teach. 8 The state of Wash­
ington Supreme Court held: 
No rule of law is· better settled than that, if a con­
tract is entire, it oan be enforced only in its entirety, 
and a breach as to any material part of an entire contract 
is a complete discharge, and releases the other party of 
his obligation to perform. 
In Missouri the Appellate Court has beld that unless 
the statute so stipulates, it is unneoessary that a teach­ ~. 
er's certifioate oover the entire period of employment, as 
the teaoher may renew his certificate at its expiration. 9 
The reasoning of the Missouri oases is based upon the the­
ory that the statutory prohibition runs against the district 
board and not against the teacher. It was the duty or the 
'Sohool Dist. v. Ozmer, 81 Ark. 194, 98 S. W. 974. 
8K1mhall v. School District, 23 Wash. 520; O'Leary v. 
school District, lle-Mioh. 469. 
. 9Abler v. School District, 141 Mo. App. 189; 124 S. W. 
564; Hibbard v. smith-,135 Mo. App. 189, 116 S. W. 48?; 
School D1st-riot v. Edlnonston, 50 Mo. App. 65. 
board to see that ~he teaoher possessed the requisite evi­
denoe of qualification before making salary payments. 
It is, however, generally held that the failure of a 
teaoher to renew a oertifioate that has expired during the 
term renders the teacher ineligible to teach and to recover 
for servioes rendered during the period he is without a cer­
tifioate. 10 The Supreme Court of Vermont ruled to the con­
trary in an early deoision, but the preoedent has not been 
followed. ll 
Evidently the intent of all statutes prohibiting boards 
of education and school directors from employing uncertifi­
cated teaohers is to proteot the people of the state against 
the employment of unqualified teaohers. If education is a 
function of the state, then, plainly, one of the first dut­
ies of the state in exercise of this function, would be to 
prescribe eligibility requirements for its teachers and to 
prohibit the employment of ineligible ones. In suoh an 
event it would then follow that unoertifioated teachers 
oould not teaoh a legal sohool or reoover for servioes ren­
dered on the contract, nor could such teaoher reoover dam­
ages for breaoh of contraot by the employing board nor main­
tain aotion in quant~ meruit. The Supreme Court of Miohi­
gan has announced the following doctrine: 
The general polioy of the school law is that schools 
shall be taught by qualified teaohers, but necessities may 
iODevoe v. School District, 77 Mich. 610; People v. 
Board of Eduoation, 67 N•. Y. S. 836. 
IlHolman v. Schoel District, 34 vt. 270. 
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arise where this cannot be done. A district may be unable 
to find a qualified teacher. Where the employment of an 
unqualified teacher is a neoessity, the school district is 
authorized to employ one who hes not the proper certificate, 
if the school board are satisfied that the teacher is oth­
erwise qualified, and to pay such teacher out of moneys be­
longing to the district.12 
Apparently no other case had gone to such an extreme; al­
though where a teacher's certificate expired during the 
term, recovery of salary for the services rendered both be­
fore and after the expiration of the cartificate has been 
sustained. 13 Such cases are contrary in principle to the 
great weight of authority. If it be legal to pay an unli­
censed teacher for teaching part of a term, why not for all 
of a term? It is believed that the doctrine of necessity 
is one of danger and uncertainty. It disregards the doctrine 
that in law a certificate is the sole test of teaching com­
petency; and it opens the door to an easy evasion of the 
wise policy of requiring teachers to be eligible before cer­
tifioation. It is not likely that many courts would allow 
a teacher oompensation under such circumstanoes. 
In Illinois it has been held that not only must a teaoh­
• 
er hold a valid certificate in order to teach a legal school, 
but that suoh certifioate must be filed with the proper of­
ficers prior to the opening of the term, and failure so to 
file would justify the sohool board in refusing to examine 
12S~ate ex reI. Hale v. Risley, Moderator, 69 Mich. 
596, 37 N. W. 570. 
13Holman v. School Trustees of Avon, 34 vt. 270; School 
Dist. v. Estes, 13 Neb. 52, 13 N. W. Ie. 
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and oertify the sohedule of the teaoher in error. 14 
The Ohio Supreme Court has deolared oonoerning the em­
ployment of a teaoher who has not a oertifioate: 
The law forbids the employment of a teacher who has 
not a certificate. The t eaoher is not "employed" wi thin 
the meaning and intent of this provision, until he engages 
in the discharge of his duties as a teaoher. The misohief 
intended to be guarded against was the teaching of a sohool 
by an incompetent person, and not the making of a oontraot 
by an inoompetent person. 15 
The legislative intent in each instanoe is what the oourts 
will attempt to carry out. 
There are two theories of law by whioh oourts have 
found it possible under oertain ciroumstanoes to permit the 
teaoher unoertificated at the time of negotiating the oon­
tract to enter sUbsequently upon a valid oontraot. One is 
the ratifioation theory, and the other is the implied con­
traot theory. These theories will be oonsidered in the or­
der mentioned. 
Whether or not a teaoher uncertifioated at the time 
of oontracting, who obtains a certificate prior to entrance 
upon employment, may have the oontraot ratified depends up­
on the oourt's view as to whether the original contract is 
void ab initio or whether the original oontract is valid ab 
initio, but voidable in case the teacher fails to seoure 
the oertifioate. The former view is held by the Colorado 
14Botkins v. Osburn, 3~ Ill. 101; Casey v. Baldridge, 
15 Ill. 65; SDdth v. Curry, 16 Ill. 14~. 
15School District v. Dilman, 220 Ohio 1~4. 
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Supreme Court in School District v. Kirby,16 while the Ark­
ansas Supreme Court in Lee v. Mitchell holds that a board 
may not restrain a teacher from entering upon his contract 
where the oertificate has been secured prior to the open­
ing of the school but subsequent to the signing of the con­
traot. l ? Evidently there is oonflict of opinion on this 
point due to difference of interpretation placed upon the 
status of the original contract. The weight of authority 
would seam to indicate that where a statute requires a teach­
er to hold a certifioate at the time of entering into a con­
tract, the contract made by an uncertificated teaoher is 
void and cannot thereaf'ter be ratified. But where the sta­
tutory prohibition refers to the employment rather then the 
contract of employment, the subsequent acquisition of a cer­
tifioate by the uncertificated teacher, before, at, or even 
after his entry upon employment may amount to a ratification 
of the original contraot. 
The reason why a teacher uncertificated at the time of 
oontracting oannot subsequently ratify said contract by the 
acquisition of a certificate and entrance upon teaching, 
where the statutory prohibition refers to the contract of 
employment rather than the employment, is well stated in 
the following excerpt from the Texas Court of Civil Appeals: 
The original corttract was void, because repugnant to 
the statute, and it could not have been ratified and certainly 
16School District v. Kirby, 27 Colo. App. 300.
 
17Lee v. Mitahell, 108 Ark. 1.
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cannot be vitalized by obtaining a certificate and endeav­
oring to have it read as though of date anterior to the 
execution of the contract ••••,He (teacher) did not have it 
when he entered into contract and that instrument being 
null and void in its inception could not be vitalized and 
purified by any sUbsequent events, but it is so nugatory
and ineffectual that nothing can cure it.18 
When is a teacher entitled to compensation? In general, 
it may be said that a legally qualified teacher regularly 
appointed and employed, having performed the agreed services 
according to the terms of the contract in a substantial man­
mer and in compliance with the laws of the state and the 
rules and regulations of the employing board is entitled to 
compensation. 
A teacher having performed the agreed services stipulat­
ed by the contract is entitled to compensation. 19 Having 
performed his part of the contraot, he cannot legally be re­
fused oompensation for failure of the board to perform its 
duty toward certain children of the district,20 or beoause 
the district had been consolidated ,nth other districts. 21 
The teacher's claim to compensation rests ,upon the perform­
ance of agreed servi.ces even thoug'h such services are to be 
performed in an unusual'manner. Thus it was held that a 
teacher might divide her time between two. schools, one a col­
lege and the other a public school, where both employer's con­
sent and the payments are equitably distributed to eaoh. 22 
I8RIChards v. Rlchardson, 168 S. W. 50. 
19Brown v. White, 43 Calif. App. 363. 
20State v. Blain, 36 Ohio St. 429. 
21sproul v. smith, 40 N. J. L. (Vroom) 314. 
22Clay v. School District, 174 N. W. 47. 
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But where the teacher voluntarily paid the rent for the 
schoolhouse and purchased the necessary supplies, such 
teacher is not entitled to reimbursement as it was an at­
tempt to recover for services not agreed upon. In such in­
stance the court said: 
The teachers in oontracting and paying these obliga­
tions were volunteers. No man entirely or his own volition 
can make another his debtor. The sohool board would have 
been required by mandamus, at the suit of any proper party, 
to furnish a place for the conduct of the school. 23 
A. Similar ruling is made under like conditions in Taylor 
v. School District. 24 In'this oase the court ruled that a 
teaoher entering into a contract to teach was not thereby 
invested with any of the statutory powers conferred upon 
the board of direotors. The extent of power conferred up­
on a teacher to bind the board Qy an implied contract for 
services other than teaching is neither greater nor less 
than that of any other individual. 
The ~eacher's contract is for agreed services substan­
tlally rendered. Thus it' has been held that the refusal 
of a clerk to receive from a teacher the school register 
and sohedule at the completion of the term cannot defect re­
oovery of compensation on the ground that the register was 
not delivered according to the statute. The tender of the 
register was a substantial compliance of the agreement there­
to. 25 Nor maya board withhold a teacher's wages because 
23Noble v. Williams, 150 Ky. 439, 42 L. R. A.. (N. S.) 1177 
24Taylor v. School District, 60 Mo. App. 372. 
25Cobb v. School District, 63 Vt. 67; School Directors 
v. sprague; 78 Ill. App. 390. 
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she permitted some of the older pupils to "hear" classes ­
it not being contrary to the rules of the board, and nec­
essary, moreover, owing to the crowded oondition of the 
room. 26 
When a teacher is selected and employed, the contraot 
is for the personal services of that teacher. The teacher 
oan not fulfill the oontract by hiring a substitute•••• The 
oircumstances might be such that the teacher would be War­
ranted in assuming the approval thereof, or the consent 
thereto by the employers without any express consent. 27 
Whether such substituted service was accepted by the board 
i6 a question of fact for the jury where action is brought 
for recovery of campensation. 28 
The teacher agrees .not only to perform acoording to 
the terms of the contraot but also aooording to the reCluire­
ments of the statutes whioh are either expressly or implied­
ly made a part of the contract. Nor may a teacher acting 
in the capaoity of pr1noipal and performing the prinoipal's 
work receive the pay fixed for a principal, not having ob­
tained the required prinoipal's lioense. 29 Nor maya teaoh­
er reoeive a larger stipend for rendering service in a high­
er capacity without securing the proper certifioate. 50 Nor 
maya teacher acting as principal, who was not appointed to 
the position in the statutory manner, recei v·e the fixed salary 
26Perkins v. School District, 61 Mo. App. 512. 
2?SchQol Directors v. HUdson, 88 Ill. 563. 
28Southern Industrial Insti~ute v. Hillier, 142 Ala. 686. 
29Brown v. Board of Education, 128 N. Y. S. 16; GormJ.el 
v. Board" of Education; -129 N.Y. S. 155; Stetson v. Board of 
Education, 150 N. Y. S. 847. 
30stre~ky v. Board of Education, 124 N. Y. S. 905; wat­
~ v. Board of Education, 155 N. Y. S. 125. 
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of a prinoipal. 31 Under a Kentucky statute providing that 
no teacher shall teach high school sUbjeots except by writ­
ten contract, it was held that common school teachers, who 
taught high school subjeots by resolution or the board but 
without a written contraot, could not reoover compensation 
for their services. 32 Favorable as well as unfavorable re­
quirements of the statutes will be read into the teacherts 
contract. Thus, a statute provided payment of regular sal­
ary to pUblic school teachers in any county while in at­
tendanoe upon an institute. Such statute was held to apply 
to those teachers, who, at the time of the institute, were 
not yet employed to teach in the county, but were employed 
within three months after the close of the institute. 53 So, 
too, it was held that employed teachers attending an insti­
tute during vacation before the regular opening of school 
were entitled to pay for the institute work in addition to 
their first month's salary.34 
Litigation over the reduction of the compensation of 
teachers has arisen in two important classes of cases. First, 
where the contract of the teacher has been interrupted. by 
act of the board or other agency; seoond, where the inter­
ruption has beeh due to the voluntary act or omission of the 
teacher. The former classification includes cases where the 
3lHe-f::ITng v. Board of Education,. 104 N. Y. S. 941. 
3220unty Board of E~ucation v. pUdley, 153 Ky. 426. 
33B13verstock v. Board of Education, 75 Ohio st. 144. 
34See 33. 
sohool has been closed for epidemics, unfitness of building 
for ocoupancy by fire or other cause, holidays, lack of 
funds, special provisions of the contract, prohibitory acts 
or omissions of the board, and dismissal of the teacher. 
The latter olass1fication includes absences of teacher with­
out consent of the board, the resignation and abandomnent ­
of con tract by the teaoher•. 
There is a familiar and general rule of law which holds 
that when the performance of a cont ract becomes impossi ble 
on account of an act of God or of the public enemy the non­
performance is exoused and no damages can be recovered there­
for. Thus there is no doubt that When one agrees to work 
for another for a certain time and is prevented by his own 
sickness or the sickness and death of the other he is excused 
from completion and may reoover pro r~~a. This rule has sig­
nificant application in cases where the public schools are 
temporarily olosed either voluntarily by act of the board, 
or upon order of the board of health in times of a community 
epidemio. Is suoh olosing of the school due to an aot of 
God or not? 
If it 1s an act of God, then palinly the teacher who 
holds herself ready and Willing to perform is not entitled 
to compensation .during the time of temporary suspension. It 
has generally been held, however, that although the epidemic 
itself may be properly oalled an aot of God, still it must 
appear that the observance of the oontraot by the district 
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rule	 is stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court to be: 
Whenever a contract whioh was possible and legal at the 
time it was made becomes impossible by act of God or illegal 
by an ordinance of the state, the obligation to perform it 
is discharged. . 
. 35Board of Education v. Couch, 162 P. 485; carth~e 
School Town v. G4Sg, 10 Ind. App. 428; Dewel' v. sch~o Dis­trictl.. 43 Mich. " 38 Am. Rep. 206; Holter v. School Dis­
trict, 73 Pa. Sup. Ct. 14; Libby v. Innab~tants of Douglas, 
!75 Mass. 128; McKay v. Barnett, 21 utah 239; 50 t. R. A. 
371; Randolph v. Sanders, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 331; Smith V. 
Schoo! District, 89 Kans. 225, Ann. Cases 1914 d. 139; Phelps 
v.	 School District, 221 Ill. App. 500. 
36See 35. 
37School District v. Howard, 5 Neb. 340. 
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follows: 
We may say that when a school board makes a contract 
with a teaoher for a definite time, it must pay him for 
that time even though there is no teaching for him to do. 
And this is true even though the contract provide that the 
teaoher shall be paid only for time actually occupied in 
school, for the evident intent of the parties was merely 
to stop payment during vacation or absences. Vlhere a con­
tract is to do acts which can be performed, nothing but 
the act of God or of a public enemy or the interdiction of 
the law as a direct and sole oause of the failure will se­
cure performance. But, of course, the school district may 
save itself from liability in such a oase by a proper pro­
vision in the contraot of employment. 38 
3824 RUling Case Law, 619. 
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The weight of authority holds that deductions cannot 
be made from the compensation of a teacher where the school 
is closed on account of the destruotion of the building by 
fire or other oause rendering the building unfit for use. 39 
An exception to this holding is found in a case where the 
contract was made with referenoe to a particular building.40 
There the law of contracts to do work in a particular build­
ing was applied. The doctrine of these cases is covered- in 
the following excerpt: 
The disoharge of either party to the contract would not 
result ~s a matter of law because of the destruction of the 
building. 
A school teacher is entitled to compensation when he 
is prevented by the school authorities from performing his 
part of the contract. In case of an unauthorized closing 
of school by the school directors before the end of the term, 
the teaoher is entitled to compensation for full regular 
term. 41 
No lawful deductions :from the compensation o:f the teaoh­
er can be made because of absence on reoognized holidays.42 
39Bramley v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 213; Charles­
ton School Township v. Hay, 74 Ind. 129; Cashen v. Scliool 
District, 50 Vt. 30; Corn v. Board of Educat1on, 36 I1i. App. 
446; Smith v. School DIStrict, 69 Mich. 589; School Directors 
v.	 Crews, 23 Ill. App. ~57. 
40Hall v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 213. 
41NOble v. Wi 11fams, 150 Ky. 439; Smith v. school Dis­
trict, 89 Kans. 225, Ami. Cases 1914 d. 139; Tripp v. School 
District, 50 Wis. 651. 
42Board of Education v. State of Kansas, 7 Kans. App. 
620; Hollowaz v. School District, 62 Mich. 153; school D~S­
trict v. Gage, 29 Mich. 484, 33 Am. Rep. 421. 
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lhe principle underlying this rule is stated by the Supreme 
Court of Michigan in School District v. Ga5e. 
In regard to deductions for holidays we are of the opin­
ion that school management should always confol~ to those 
decent usages which recognize the propriety of omitting to 
hold public exercises on recognized holidays; and that it 
is not lawful ~o impose the forfeiture or deductions for 
such proper suspension of labor. Schools should conform to 
what may fairly be expected of all institutions in civilized 
communities. 
So, too, it is held that a teacher is entitled to compensa­
tion for a special vacation properly ordered. 43 Compensa­
ti.on for compulsory attendance upon teachers' institutes has 
already been noted. Where the board of education had order­
ed a two days' holiday at Thanksgiving time and the teachers 
objected, if thereby they would lose their wages, it was 
held that the teachers were entitled to their wages; this, 
too, although, the rules of the board provided that the school 
year shOuld consist of thirty-six oonsecutive weeks exclu­
sive of vacation. Vacation was interpreted to mean "an in­
termission of the regular duties end exercises of an insti­
tution between terms."44 
Is a school teacher SUbject to deduction of compensa­
tion where the school is closed by a board of directors be­
cause of lack of funds? The answer seems to depend upon 
whether the lack of funds is due to the exhaustion of all 
legally available funds or due merely to neglect of co11ec­
43Central Board of Education v. Stephenson, 16 W. N. C. 
(pa.) 124. 
44Board of Education v. State, 7 Kans. App. 620. 
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tion ot funds. To keep the school open and pay the teachers 
might, in the first instance, result in an ultra vires act, 
but, in the second instance, it would not be a good defense 
for making void the teacher's contract. It was held in 
Morley v. Power that where a teacher contracts for compensa­
tion at a monthly rate, without any fixed ter.m of employment, 
and for want of funds an authorized shortening of the time 
ocours, a corresponding deduction in the salary of the teach­
er may be made. 45 But it has been held, that where a board 
of sehool control recklessly or ignorantly exhausts appropri­
ated teacher funds for other purposes before oompletion of 
the teacher's contraot and then refuses payment for lack of 
funds, the teacher is entitled to compensation. 46 
The seoond classification includes those cases where 
absence is due to a~t or omission of the teacher and the 
resignation and the abandonment of contraet. A school teach­
er is sUbjeet to deduotion in compensation when absent from 
duty without leave,4? unless there is a rule permitting 
teachers to provide substitutes at their own expense!48 Ab­
senoe due to act or omission of the teacher has been little 
considered in adjudicated cases. In a case arising under 
the New York City Charter, a teacher was ill from'March ~o 
September, and in October made an unsuccessful application 
45Morley v. Power, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 219; RU~y v. Sohool 
Distr1ct. 30 Mo. App. 113; Saunders v. State, Ohio Cir. 
Ct. R. 475. 
46Myers v. School District, 104 Okla. 51. 
47Murphy v. Board of Education, 84 N. Y. S. 580. 
48District of Columbia v. Dean, 38 App. (D.C.) 182. 
> ­
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to the sohool board to be exoused with pay. Referring to 
the Charter the oourt said: 
The salary of an employee not being an inoident to the 
office, but payment for service rendered, there would cer­
tainly be nothing illegal in a provision changing the con­
ditions under whioh the salary is paid, so that it is pay­
able only for the period for which services are actually
rendered. The sohool board therefore has the right to re­
duce the Salary of a teacher by providing that he is to re­
ceive no oompensation for the days on which he is absent 
Without leave. 49 
Maya teacher, who has voluntarily resigned or aban­
doned his contract before the expiration of the term, re­
cover compensation for servioes rendered up to the time of 
the resignation or abandonment? The answer to the question 
will depend upon whether the attempt is to reoover in 
assumpsit upon the,contract or upon a quantum meruit. In 
jurisdictions where a teacher's oontraot is held to be in­
divisible or entire, notwithstanding the oompensation is 
payable by the month, the teacher would recover nothing on 
the oontract. In other jurisdictions he has been permitted 
to recover on a quantum meruit. 
What are the remedial processes accessible to the dis­
missed teaoher? Is the order ot dismissal against a teach­
er by a board of school control final or may it be reviewed 
by another body such as a court or an appeal body? Obvious­
ly this answer depends upon the statues in the various 
states. In general it may be said, that where the board of 
school control dismisses the teacher in accordance With the 
49Murphy v. Board of Education, 84 N. Y. S. 380. 
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statutory provisions, such act is conclusive on the courts, 
in the absence of fraud, corruption, or oppression. 50 The 
aggrieved teacher, however, may in some .jurisdictions car­
ry his case to an appeal body or o~ficer. 
The exercise by a school board of statutory authority 
to dismiss at pleasure being discretionary cannot be ques­
tioned by the courts. In some jurisdictions no action lies 
in favor of a teacher to review a dismissal. Nor can the 
courts inquire into the wisdom of such dismissal. 51 
Under the statutes in many jurisdictions a teaoher who 
has been dismissed has a right to appeal to a higher board 
or officer such as a county or a state superintendent. 52 
SoIDe courts hold that where the right of appeal exists, such 
remedy should be pursued before the teacher can maintain ac­
tion for breach of contract. Thus in Moreland v. Wln~, it 
was said that the dismissed teacher could not enjoin the de­
fendant, sucoessor, where plaintiff had failed to appeal to 
county and state superintendents. In some jurisdictions, 
however, suoh a rule does not apply where the teaoher, for 
50Board of Education v. Stotler, 95 Ill. App. 255; Finch 
v. School District, 235 Mioh. 075 • 
. 51Ewin v. school Distriot, 10 Idaho 102; Gillan v. Board 
of Rege'iit"S;'" 88 Wrs. 7, 24 L.R.l~. 536; state v. Hawkins, 44 
Ohio st, 98; state v. Prince, 45 Wis. 610. . 
52Burkhead v. School Distri.9t., 107 Iowa 29; Draper v. 
Commissioners, 66 N• .T.L. 54; Fltz6eralcl v. school District, 
5 Wash. 112; Harkness v. Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383; Kirkpatrick 
~. School District, 53 Iowa 585; Morela~d v. Wyne Tex. civ. 
App. 1901; People v. HUbbell, 56 N. Y. S. 642; Park v. Inde­
~ende~t, etc., 65 Iowa 209; Ridenour v. Board orwucat~ 
7 N. Y. S. 109; White v. Woh1enberg, 113 Iowa 236; Van Dyke 
v. School District, 43 Wash. 235; Schulz v. school Distriot, 
204 N. W. 281~----
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instanoe, has been wrongfully discharged without a hearing. 
Suoh action of the board amounts to a nullity and the teach­
er may bring action for breaoh of contract without taking 
an appeal. 53 Again, an exoeption to the rule is noticed in 
People v. Board of Education, where there was no present in­
oumbent of the office of State Commissioner of Education. 
In this oase it was held that a teacher wrongfully dismissed 
might resort to the Supreme Court for relief. The dismissal, 
however, may beooroo final if the right of appeal is not tak­
en promptly.54 And it is generally said that a decision of 
the appeal body affirming the dismissal of a teacher 1s fin­
al and is not subjeot to review by the courts. 55 In the 
Maryland oase cited, the Supreme Court held that it could 
not review the decision of the State Board of Education af­
firming the dismissal of a teacher although the appeal pow­
er was not expressly given to the State Board of Education. 
In the Iowa oase oited, the court beld that an appeal to the 
county superintendent of public instruction settled oonolu­
sively the wrongfulness of a school teaoher's discharge al­
though such appeal was determined on the ground of statutory 
procedure rather than on the merits or the dismissal. 
53B~khead v. School District , 107 Iowa 29; Curtri~ght 
v. School District, 111 Iowa 20; Caffrey v. Court, 72 wash. 
444. 
54Harkness v. Hutoherson, 90 Tex. 383; Morelan~ v. Wyne,
Tex. Civ. App. 1901. - ­
55Board of sohool Commissioner~ v. Manning, 123 Md. 169; 
Dr~Fer v. School Comm., 66 N.~.L. 154; Jackson v. School Dis­
triot, 110 Iowa 313; Levitoh v. Board of Education, 209 N.Y.S. 
271; People v. HubbelI,~ 56 N.Y.S. 642; People v. Board of Ed­
uoation; 66 N.Y.S. 149; Van Dyke v. School DIst., 43 Wash. 
235. 
l 
80 
In addition to the statutory right of appeal, the ais-
missed teacher has access under certain conditions to three 
types of remedial court procedure. The dismissed teacher 
may ask the court to pass upon the wrongfulness or the dis­
missal; he ,may bring action for damages upon a breach of con­
traot; o~ he may seek his reinstatement through the equity 
proaesses of tbe oourt. 
Where a teacher has been dismissed, it appears that in 
most jurisdiotions the court will not interfere with the ex­
ercise of a board's statutory discretion to dismiss such 
teaoher provided it has acted within its jurisdiction and 
has complied with all the statutory requirements Of dismis­
sal. 56 But in an action for breach of contract, the courts 
will go into the wrongfulness of the dismissal and sUbmit 
to the jury the question of faat in reference to the same. 57 
Where the statutes do not set out the formalities for a dis­
missal procedure, there is some authority that in an inquiry 
as to whether the teacher was wrongfully dismissed the courts 
will go so far as to inquire into the reasonableness of the 
cause of dismissal and even submit the teacher's profession­
al competence to the j!ury.58 
Obviously, where a teacher has been wrongfully dismissed, 
such teacher has a remedy at law for a breaoh of his contraot 
50peop~e v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318.
 
5?Gurk~t v. Joint School District, 15g Wis. 14g; Shuck
 
v. Board of Eduoatton, g2 Ohio st. 55. 
58Neville v. School Directors, 36 Ill. ?l; School Di­
reotors v. Reddick, ?? Ill. 628. 
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and, under certain conditions, is entitled to mandamus for 
reinstatement to the position from which he has been wrong­
fully dismissed. As already noticed, some jurisdictions hold 
that the wrongfully discharged teacher has his remedy at 
law, without first taking his statutory appeals. More usual­
ly, however, teachers wrongfully dismissed seek reinstate­
ment to the position from which they have been wrongfully 
dismissed. 
Assume that a wrongful dismissal of a teacher has been 
found either by the appeal body or the court, and that the 
teacher seeks the remedy of reinstatement rather than dam­
ages for a breach of contract. Under these circumstances, 
if the board refuses reinstatement, the teacher has her 
remedy through mandamus prooeedings provided certain condi­
tions of equity jurisdiction obtain. What are these pre­
requisite conditions of equity? It is generally said that 
such teacher cannot maintain mandamus to compel reinstate­
ment, whose relations to the school authority rest wholly 
in contract .. A teacher, it is said, is not a public offi­
cer and his contract is one 
, 
asof employment in so far in 
case of wrongful dismissal, an adequate remedy at law lies 
in damages for breach of the contract, and a writ of manda­
mus will not be issued. 59 Nor in such case can eqUity be 
invoked whether the bill is brought by the teacher herself 
59state v. Smith, 49 Neb. 755; Swartwood v. Wallace, 
57 Hun. (N. Y.) 34. 
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or by a taxpayer,50 the reason being, in both oases, that 
the remedy at law is adequate. 5l 
It is only where the teaoher by positive provisions 
of law has a fixed tenure of ottice or can be removed only 
for oause and in some presoribed manner, and where, conse­
quently, it is the plain ministerial duty of the school 
board to retain him, that mandamus can be maintained. such 
is the rule laid down in the case last cited. Or, again, 
the rule is stated that where the teacher's right rests up­
on statute or other law, mandamus will lie to compel rein­
statement after a wrongful dismissal has been determined. 52 
Thus, where a higher authority, such as an appeal body, 
reverses the dismissal order of the board of school control 
and orders r~instatement, mandamus will lie. 53 Such teach­
er is said to have a right other than that determined by 
contract. But where a teacher has been dismissed without 
notice or hearing, and such dismissal prooedure has been 
60Greer--V. Aus~t in. 40 Okla, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 336; 
School District v. Carson, 9 Colo. App. 5. 
6lState v. Board of Education, 18 N. M. 183; 49 L.R.A. 
(N.	 S.) 62. 
52~oYle v. SChool District, 8 Pa. Dist. 436; Fairchild 
v. Boar -of Educa1;ion, 107 Calif. 92; Gilman v. Barrett, 
33 Conn. 298; Kennedt v. Board of Education, 82 Calif. 483; Morley v. Power, 10ea (Tenn.) 21~; People v. Board of Edu­
cation, 181 N. Y. S. 804; Pearsoll v. Wools, Tex. eiv. App.
1899; People v. Van Siclen, 43 Hun. (N. Y.) 537; state v. 
Watertown, 9 Wis. 254; Whitman v. Owen, 76 Miss. 18~ 
5~Board of School Commissione~. Manni~, 123 Md. 159; 
Thompson v. Board orEauca~ion, 57 N. J. L. 52 • 
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approved by the county superintendent on appeal as provid­
ed by statute, mandamus will not lie. The teacher had no 
higher right tnan his contract, as the appeal was decided 
against him. He was therefore confined to his remedy at 
law. 64 
The decision of courts in reference to the right of 
mandamus and other equitable rights in jurisdictions, where, 
under tenure codes, the teacher possesses more than a con­
tract right to teach, are worthy of study. 
64Taylor v. Marshall, 12 Calif. App. 549. 
CHAPTER VI
 
GEHERAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
 
The issues involved and which frequently arise and 
which may be generally embraoed within the general soope 
or the legal oonoept of the teacher's contract may be 
briefly summarized as follows: 
Ll) Issues which arise and exist between boards of 
education and teaoher in cases involving: 
(a)	 Contracts which are unenforoeable on account 
of not being mutual, certain, definite, and 
free from rraud or misrepresentation. 
(b)	 Contracts in which the statutory terms and 
provisions relative to the board's actions 
have been disregarded in part or overlooked 
entirely. 
(c)	 In oases involving the corporate action or the 
board and the lack of authority for individual 
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hiring. 
(g)	 In cases where no statute required the contract 
of the teacher to be in writing. 
(h)	 In cases where the statute required the contract 
to be in writing. 
( i )	 In cases concerning a substantial compliance 
with statutory formalities, and the failure to 
express the contract in any material particu­
lar. 
(j)	 In aases revealing the vote of the board of ed­
ucation not oonstituting a contract of employ­
ment with the teaoher. 
(2) The issues involved and wh1ch arise and exist con­
cerning the contractual powers of the school board: 
(a)	 Involving contracts between the board of edu-·. 
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cation and the teacher in which the teacher 
has not been duly licensed and certificated. 
(b)	 In cases concerning the requirements by the 
board of education of the qualifications of 
the teacher in addition to those prescribed 
by law. 
(c)	 In cases iffiposing qualifications upon teachers, 
not prescribed by law, and the nature of which 
is not related to the prescribed legal quali­
fications, such as: mental tests, examinations, 
residence and experience. 
(d)	 In oases concerning the i~position of the board 
upon the teacher limitations or qualifioations 
of a more personal or local nature, such as: 
sex limitations, religious qualifications, re­
striction in labor affiliations. 
(e)	 In cases concerning the validity of a contract 
with a teacher for services commencing beyond 
the term of office of the members of such board. 
(3) In the issues dealing with the removal and dismissal, 
these issues between the board of education and the teacher 
have arisen in the following cases: 
(a)	 In oases involving the dismissal of the teacher 
by the board under its implied powers. 
(b)	 In cases involving the right to dismiss the teacher 
8? 
at will when no statute specifies the causes 
for which the teacher may be removed. 
(c)	 In the cases involving the dismissal of the teach­
er on account of immoral conduct, unprofession­
al conduct, insubordination, negligence,inef­
ficiency and incompetency. 
(d)	 In cases concerning dismissal on account of mar­
riage subsequent to the execution of the con­
tract. 
(e)	 In cases involving a dismissal of a te,a'cher wi th­
out notice by the board pursuant, to a statute, 
requiring no notice to be given. 
(f)	 In cases involving dismissal of a teacher when 
fraud, corruption or oppression have exercised 
a controlling influence. 
(g)	 In oases concerning the dismissal of a teacher 
in violation of a teacher tenure law. 
(h)	 In cases involving the indirect dismissal of a 
teacher by transfer or reassignment which defeats 
the statutory rights to removal for cause only. 
(4) A brief summary of the contraotual powers of the teach­
er includes a consideration of the following matters: 
(a)	 The privileges of the teacher under contract. 
(b)	 His right of compensation. 
(c)	 The remedial prooesses accessible to the dismissed 
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teacher. 
(d) The classification of his legal remedies. 
A second purpose suggested as a possible outcome of 
the study was to correlate and reveal some legal princi­
ples which have been de·oisive of cases in which the is­
sues involved were related to teacher contracts, and which 
might serve as practical aids to those who may be confront­
ed by legal questions pertaining to teacher contracts. The 
rorty-five guiding principles which follow are the result 
of an organization and a classification of the essential 
principles and standards discovered in the foregoing chap­
ters. 
Forty-five Guiding Legal Principles. 
(1) The contract of employment invests the teacher 
with public character and establishes a legal relation­
ship between the board of eduoation and the teaoher. 
(Chap. II) 
(2) The teacher's contract does not differ from any 
othe~ contractual relationship and may be jUdged by the 
same criteria as any other contraot. The making and exe­
cution of contracts with teachers are controlled by the 
rules and principles relative to simple contraots in gen­
eral. (Chap. II) 
(3) Contracts must be mutual in character, definite 
based upon a valid consideration) and must be entered into 
by parties of legal capacity. There must be no misrepre­
sentation (fraudulent) or the agreement may be declared 
void by common law. (Chap. II) 
(4) A school board's authority to oontract lies in its 
unitory or corporate action; individual members have no 
authority to oontract) then single action may be repudi­
ated. (Chap. II) 
(5) The board must oonvene as a board in order to en­
ter into a valid c,ontract of employment with a teacher. 
All members must have opportunity to be present. (Chap. II) 
(6) The law holds that while boards may delegate to 
the superintendent the power of s~lecting teachers) the 
power to authori~e the appointment of teacher cannot be 
delegated) suoh power having been speoif'1cal1y conferred 
upon boards by statute. The maxim delegatia potestas non 
:e"otest delegari applies. (Chap. II) 
(7) statutes quite generally make invalid a teaoher 
contract in which a board member holds or may hold a pecu­
niary interest. (Chap. II) 
(8) Authority to oontract with teachers implies. power 
to agree upon compensation. (Chap. II) 
(9) Oral contracts valid in absence of statutory pro­
visions. No law of contracts is found which makes it in­
herently necessary to place a teacher's contract in writing. 
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It is true, however, that the teacher should require the 
contract to be in writing, as it is more easily proven, 
and furnishes the teacher with sUbstantial evidence. 
(Chap. II) 
(lO) There can be no recovery by the teacher upon the 
oral agreeme'nt, i.f the statute requires a written one. 
(Chap. II) 
(11) When the teacher has been elected by the boar<J., 
it is the duty of the chairman and secretary of the board 
to execute the written contraot for and in behalf of the 
board. (Chap. II) 
(12) Notwithstanding the rigid requirements of statute 
in reference to contractual requisites already considered, 
the oourts will often find a substantial compliance with 
the statuto-ry formali ties and thus maintain validity of the 
contract. (Chap. II) 
(13) Where a statute presoribes a mode of exercising 
a power, that mode must be adopted. Contract may be held 
unenforceable- on account of inde~initeness if contract does 
not state period of employment, assignment of teaoher, or 
salary to be received. (Chap. II) 
(14) A mere vote of election by the board does not con­
stitute a contract of employment. (Chap. II) 
(15) The application of the teacher should be written, 
detailed and definite; and an acceptance of it by the board 
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constitutes a contract, unobjectionable from the standpoint 
of certainty. (Chap. II) 
(16) A contract to be valid must be mutual, certain, 
definite and free from fraud and illegality and must be 
legally authorized and executed and meet all the necessary 
requisites, both of the cornmon law and of the statute. 
(Chap. II) 
(I?) Histor1cally, local boards or committees of school 
oontrol exercised the right to impose eligibility require­
ments before the state t00k over such authority. Consequent­
ly, the board, still retains the right to establish eligi­
bility requirements for teachers, within reasonable limits, 
not in conflict with the laws of the state. (Chap. III) 
(18) The appointive power delegated to the school board 
is a discTetionary one, and when exercised within reason­
able limits and in conformity with the statutes, such exer­
cise oannot be questioned either by the courts or the tax­
payers of the district. (Chap. III) 
(19) Boards may exercise wide discretionary power in 
the enactment of rules and regulations controlling selec­
tion and appointment. Courts will not interfere unless there 
is gross abuse of the discretionary power. (Chap. III) 
(20) If there is no implied or expressed statutory lim­
itations, a board of school control in good faith, may bind 
their successors in offioe to the appointment of a teacher 
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whose term neither begins or ends within the individual 
membership of the appointing board. (Chap. III) 
(21) Boards may not delegate statutory authority to 
contract with teachers, but may delegate authority to con­
traot with a particular teacher or in praotice ratify all 
oontraots made with teachers by the superintendent of 
schools. (Chap. III) 
(22) The authority of a school board to employ a teach-, 
er oarries with it by necessary implication the authority 
to dismiss a teacher for suff1cient cause. (Chap. III) 
(23) The authority to dismiss has been followed by 
statutes which designate, causes of dismissal, and procedure 
necessary. (Chap. III) 
(24) There is considerable authority that boards of 
education have the implied power to dismiss for sufficient 
oause. (Chap. IV) 
(25) The authority to dismiss should be limited to jUs~ 
and sufficient cause and the board must act with discretion 
and judgment. (Chap. IV) . 
(26) It is possible to reserve in the contract of em­
ployrnent the right to dismiss the teacher at will or if his 
servioes are unsatisfactory, especially if no statute spec­
ifies the causes for which teachers may be removed. (Chap. 
IV) 
(27) If the jury deems the dismissal improper, the 
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teacher may reoover damages for breach of the contract. 
(Chap. IV) 
(28) Actual or reputed immorality is sUffioient cause 
for dismissal. Innnorali ty does not need to be in connec- , 
tion with the sohool work. (Chap. IV) 
(29) Unprofessional conduct. as a teacher's advooacy 
of a partioular candidate and political acti~ities in an 
election, is oonduot warranting suspension. (Chap. IV) 
(30) Refusal of the teacher to be vaccinated; re­
fusal of the teaoher to receive a pupil suspended; and 
the refusal to obey rules of the board was held to be sUf­
fioient oause for dismissal. (Chap. IV) 
(31) Incompeten,cy, lack of requisi te qualities of 
temper, failure to manage and control the school, may con­
stitute an inefficiency sufficient for dismissal. (Chap. IV) 
(32} Marriage does not necessarily disqualify a woman 
for teaching and is not just cause for dismissal. A con­
traot in general restraint of marriage is void beoause it 
is contrary to public polioy. No court of final jurisdio­
tion 1t seems', has yet passed on the constitutionality of 
a statute, specifioally stipulating marriage as a course 
for the dismissal of women teachers. (Chap. IV) 
(33) A board may have the power to dismiss a teacher 
by statute, but in the absenoe of statute a teacher shall 
not be disoharged for cause before the end of the term 
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without the preferment of charges against him, due notice, 
and an opportun~ty to be heard. (Chap. IV) 
(34) Even though the charge be immoral conduct, the 
teaoher cannot be disoharged without a hearing. (Chap. IV) 
(35) Where the power to remove 1s restricted or limit­
ed to certain reasons or oauses, the final determination 
as to whether the case falls within any of these causes 
rests with the courts, and may be reviewed or inquired in­
to by them. (Chap. IV) 
(36) Where the power is general, unlimited, and Wlre­
stricted, and is onoe exeroised, it cannot and will not be 
questioned or examined into by the c,ourts. (Chap. IV) 
(37) It is not believed that such dismissal is conclu­
sive' whenever fraud, corruptiQn, or oppress~on eXists, or 
whenever any abuse of discretion is shown. (Chap. IV) 
(38) Under ordinary conditions the law holds that 
where a certificate holder's oertificate expires during 
the term, there can be no legal reoovery for compensation 
for sexv1ce,s rendered during the time the teaoher is wi th­
out the oertificate. There is divided authority, as to 
whether the teacher may be allowed to renew the certifi­
oate and recover for services during the unexpired term. 
(Chap. V) 
(39) The law holds that anuncertificated teacher oan­
not teach a legal school nor recover for services rendered 
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on the contract or upon a g,uantum meruit. (Chap. V) 
(40) In case the dismissed teacher is found to be 
wrongfully dismissed either by the final appeal body or the 
courts, the rights of such teacher may be sought either by 
mandamus for reinstatement or by act10n at law for damages 
in breach of the contract. (Chap. V) 
(41) In general it may be said that a legally quali­
fied teacher regularly appointed and employed, having per­
formed in a substantial manner the agreed services accord­
ing to the terms of the contract, and in compliance wi th 
the laws of the state and the rules and regulations of the 
employing board, is entitled to compensation. (Chap. V) 
(42) The board of education is excused from oompen­
sating a teacber for the period of interrupted service, 
when by an act of God, or of the publiC enemy or the inter~ 
diction of the law is a direct and sole cause of the inter­
ruption. (Chap. V) 
(43) In general the board of education is not excused 
from compensating the teacher for a period of interrupted 
service due to the following conditions; failure to provide 
place to teach even though the building was destroyed by 
fire or storm; failure to permit the teacher to teach by 
shortening the school term; failure to keep sohool on ,rec­
ognized holidays. (Chap. V) 
(44) Authority is divided on deduction in teacher's 
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salary due to closing of the school from lack of funds. 
The board cannot commit ultra vires act, and the diverg­
ing opinion is that the compensation may not be reduced 
unless all available funds are exhausted. (Chap. V) 
(45) A teacher who abandons the contract ar resigns 
oannot recover compeusation for services rendered, is a 
prevailing rule. Some jurisdictio,ns allow the teacher re­
covery in quantum meruit. (Chap. V) 
The third purpose of this study was to be an attempt 
to discover trends in the attitude of the judic1ary toward 
issues pertinent to teacher contracts. In the following 
paragraphs a c,omparison will be made of the best education­
al practices as suggested by expert authority and the best 
educations practices as supported by the trend of court de­
cisions. 
(1) Education Should Be a Funotion. of the state 
It has beoome a cODmlonplace, in discussions ooncern­
ing educational afuainistration, to assume that education is 
a function of the state, and that, therefore, members of 
boards of education are, in legal sense, state officials 
rather than municipal officials •••• The tendency on the part 
of legis1atures is to eliminate jus t as far as possi ble 
municipal civil authority from any control over school af­
fairs. This tendency is wholly desirable and it is to be 
hoped that eventually this separation of munioipal from 
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educational authorities can be made complete. (Department 
of Superintendence - First Yearbook, "The "Status of the Su­
perintendent," pp. 155-56.) 
This educational praotice has been supported by court 
decisions. This point of view is affirmed by the highest 
judicial authority. 
(2)	 The Examining or Certif lC'ating Power Should Be 
separated From The Appointive Power 
It is in general accordanc e with theprinc iples 
of a sound civil service system that the power to examine 
teachers and the power to appoint should be kept distinct. 
(Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia university, quoted in Re­
port of Educational COlnmission, Ibid., pp. 62-63.)
-
The above thesis is supported by the courts. No­
tioe particularly the excerpt from the Illinois Supreme 
Court in Board of E~ucation.of Galesburg v. Arn.old. 
(3) Local Boards Should Supplement the Statutory Cer­
tificate of the Teacher with Careful Selective 
T'echnique 
Another step in improving the conditions surround­
ing the selection of teaohers is to get oertain definite 
standards of oompetency formulated and adopted by the board 
of eduoation. Such standards giv·e both the board and the 
superintendent a foundation to stand upon and eliminate the 
most poorly prepared of the applicants. In large school 
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systems where the number of applicants and vacancies are 
both large•••• a competitive professional examination is 
often introduced. (E. P. Cubberley, Public School Admin­
istration, pp. 203-209.) 
The policy of local boards supplementing the 
statutory certificate requirements 1s encouraged by the 
courts. 
JUdge Collins in Stetson v. Board of Educat~on 218 
N. Y. 101 says: 
The provisions (local examinations) were intended to 
protect and promote the efficiency and educational usefulness 
of the pUblic schools •••• The present cOlnm1ssioner of educa­
tion h_as well said in an opinion: "The references to the re­
quirements of the state school laws contained in such provi­
sions of the Education law prescribe the minimum qualifica­
tions of teachers. Such references should not be construed 
to restrict the power of the board of education to impose ad­
ditional academic and professional qualifications as prelim­
inary requirem~nts for an appointment." 
(4)	 The Superintendent Should Select and Nominate 
Teachers 
This authority (nomination of teachers) ranks first 
among those which the superintendent initiates. It is sig­
nificant that the head of the school system should have pow­
er to initiate the appointment of teachers. This adds 
strength to his functi,ons of professional leadership and 
insures, a higher degree of cooperation in the superintendent's 
effort to improve instruction. (Department of Superinten­
denoe, FI:r-st Yearbook, "The status of the Superintendent," 
p. 153.) 
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This suggested practice is favorably cowuented up­
on by Federal J'udge Van Orsdell in United states ex rel 
Denney v. Callahan. 
(5)	 The Dismissal of a Teacher Should Be Made a Pro­
fessional Rather Than a Legal, Matter 
There appears to be a fundamental tendency for the 
oourts to base their practice on the principle that the 
state laws have set up a special organization responsible 
to the public for the, oonduct of education, including the 
administration of the appointment and dismissal of the 
teachers. 'ithin these laws the constituted authorities 
should limit their jurisdiotion, exercise their discretion, 
refrain from arbitrary action, and determine from the point 
of view of the interests of the public and the schools the 
reasonableness of the procedure. (Isaac L. Kandel, Teach­
ers College Record, XXVI, no. 3, Nov. 1924.) 
The above practice is endorsed by Justice Cuddle-
beck in the oelebrated case of People ex rel Peixotto v. 
Board ot Education 212 N. Y. 46.3. 
The proceedings of the board of education involve 
simply a matter of school discipline and are not subject to 
review by mandamus ••••Sec. 1093 of The C,i ty Charter has made 
neglect of duty ground for dismissal without any qualifying 
words •••• The general rule is that mandamus will not lie to 
review the determination that public boards of officers in 
matters involving the exercise of discretion or jUdgment, 
if they have preceded Within their jurisdiction and in sub­
stantial compliance with the form of the lew. 
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